Policy Lessons from Cleveland\u27s Economic Restructuring and the Accompanying Case Study by Hill, Edward W.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Urban Publications Maxine Goodman Levin College of Urban Affairs
2-1997
Policy Lessons from Cleveland's Economic
Restructuring and the Accompanying Case Study
Edward W. Hill
Cleveland State University, e.hill@csuohio.edu
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/urban_facpub
Part of the Policy Design, Analysis, and Evaluation Commons, and the Urban Studies and
Planning Commons
This Report is brought to you for free and open access by the Maxine Goodman Levin College of Urban Affairs at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Urban Publications by an authorized administrator of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact
library.es@csuohio.edu.
Repository Citation
Hill, Edward W., "Policy Lessons from Cleveland's Economic Restructuring and the Accompanying Case Study" (1997). Urban
Publications. 0 1 2 3 4.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/urban_facpub/4
prepared by:
Edward W. Hill
The Urban Center
Maxine Goodman Levin
College of Urban Affairs
February 1997
(The Urban Center Online version 10.20.97)
The Maxine
Goodman Levin
College of
Urban Affairs at
         The Urban University  Program                                                           Cleveland State
University
1737 Euclid Avenue
Cleveland, Ohio 44115
POLICY LESSONS
FROM
CLEVELAND’S
ECONOMIC
RESTRUCTURING
AND THE
ACCOMPANYING
CASE STUDY
Policy Lessons from Cleveland’s Economic Restructuring and the
Accompanying Case Study
by
Edward W. Hill
Senior Scholar, The Urban Center
Professor in Urban Studies and Public Administration
Maxine Goodman Levin College of Urban Affairs
Cleveland State University
February 1997
This research was sponsored by the Economic Development Administration of the U.S.
Department of Commerce under Award No. 99-07-13781 and from the Urban University
Program of Ohio’s General Assembly.  This work has benefited from the extensive
comments on earlier drafts by Tom Bier, Bill Bryant, DeWitt John, Norman Krumholz,
Richard Shatten, and Michael Springer.  I appreciate the opportunity to present the case
study and policy recommendations to my colleagues at the Levin College, to the National
Academy of Public Administration’s review panel on economic development policy, and
the urban development seminar of the U.S. Treasury Department.  Comments from
participants at the three presentations helped me refine and sharpen my arguments.  James
Austin invited me, along with a large number of people from Cleveland, to participate in
the discussion of his case study on Cleveland with his students.  Reading his case material
and listening to the comments of Terence Copeland and Bill Madar during the case
presentation proved to be very helpful as I completed this project.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
FORWARD ............................................................................................................. i
I. POLICY LESSONS FROM CLEVELAND’S ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING ........... 1
Lessons for National Urban Policy......................................................................................................... 1
1. Learning... ......................................................................................................................................1
2. Strategy...........................................................................................................................................2
3. Leadership.... ..................................................................................................................................3
4. Capacity... ......................................................................................................................................5
5. Leverage and Scale....... ..................................................................................................................6
6. Distress............................................................................................................................................8
7. Bottom-up Coordination....... ..........................................................................................................8
8. Economic Development; Not Community Development................ ..................................................9
The Structure of Cleveland-style Economic Development .................................................................. 10
II.  REVITALIZED CLEVELAND, NOT COMEBACK CLEVELAND: FEDERAL AND
LOCAL FORCES THAT REBUILT A REGION........................................................ 16
Comeback Cleveland By The Numbers ............................................................................................... 16
Downtown Construction....................................................................................................................17
Unemployment Rate..........................................................................................................................23
Employment......................................................................................................................................25
Poverty..............................................................................................................................................29
Three Recent Reports.........................................................................................................................29
Cleveland’s Culture: Once Conflict.  Now, Cooperation or Cooption? .............................................. 39
Conflict.............................................................................................................................................40
Cooperation or Cooption?..................................................................................................................44
A Fortunate Political Confluence.......................................................................................................48
The Evolution of a Development Strategy ........................................................................................... 51
The Original Strategy........................................................................................................................53
A Shared Agenda?.............................................................................................................................56
The Formula for Cleveland-style Economic Development..................................................................61
Current Strategy................................................................................................................................64
The Civic Infrastructure ...................................................................................................................... 66
The Federal Role in Cleveland’s Revitalization .................................................................................. 71
Context..............................................................................................................................................71
Federal Expenditures.........................................................................................................................72
A Story of Leverage...........................................................................................................................80
REFERENCES..................................................................................................... 85
INDEX ................................................................................................................. 89
Ned Hill Page i February 1997
Policy Lessons from Cleveland’s Economic Restructuring
and the Accompanying Case Study
Labor Day Weekend in Cleveland, 1995:  The weekend opened Friday with a
downtown parade celebrating the opening of the Rock and Roll Hall of
Fame; Saturday saw 10,000 people going through the waterfront Hall as jets
from the air show held in the adjacent airport screamed by, and, that night,
over 50,000 attended an internationally televised rock concert in Municipal
Stadium.  This was all page one news in Cleveland’s newspaper, The Plain
Dealer.  Saturday witnessed the traditional AFL-CIO Labor Day parade—
reduced to a walk between a suburban shopping center and a park, covered
on page 3 of the second section of the same newspaper.  (The parade has
been a suburban stroll since 1992.)  Cleveland has changed.
FORWARD
How does a city built for one economic and social era change to meet the demands of
another?  In essence this is what it means to be a “good” city: the ability to adapt to
external change so that people can prosper in the new economic and social environment.
Part of being a good city is the ability to invest in people and places so that physical and
social capital are available for development.  Another part of being a good city is a unified
sense of place so that people recognize a common bond that transcends their immediate
neighborhood, class, race, or ethnicity.  Finally, a good city is one that is fair and is
perceived as being fair.  All of this means that being a good city requires the ability to
continually regenerate its economic base by tying together human capital
investments¾primarily through efficient educational investments, with product innovation
and flexible local capital markets; excellence in urban design; and access for all to all parts
of the city.
This essay is about Cleveland’s attempts to remain a good city in the face of a
dramatic shock to its economic foundation.  Cleveland has recovery from profound
economic restructuring that began with the recession of 1972, and was catalyzed by the
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recessions of 1979 and 1981.  The region’s economic crisis was one of three simultaneous
problems that the region had to confront; the city of Cleveland also had to resolve political
and public administrative crises.  Even though the restructuring of the economy was at the
root of the other problems, the city’s political and administrative difficulties had to be
addressed before a strategy to address the region’s economic problems could be executed.
The political crisis revolved around the mayoralty of Dennis Kucinich, but it really marked
a shift from redistributional, populist, politics to the politics of economic development.
The city’s administrative crisis revolved around the need for City Hall, the Housing and
Transit Authorities, and the Metropolitan Park District to professionalize management,
lower costs, and focus more on service delivery and less on patronage.  In many ways
these governmental units were part of the city’s populist redistributive machinery that
could be supported under the region’s older economic structure but could not survive the
emerging economic order..
What is a city in the context of changing economic structure?  It is not the
municipal corporation, or legal city, called Cleveland; that is the city of a much earlier age
when people both lived and worked within the same set of legal boundaries.  The city
remains the territory within which people both live and work, but thanks to the automobile
and highway, Cleveland now stretches over a multi-county area that covers most of
Northeast Ohio.
This paper has two major components, each can be read as separate writings.  The
first consists of lessons for national urban policy and the practice of economic
development from Cleveland’s experience.  The second is the case study, emphasizing the
formation and implementation of the region’s economic development strategy.
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I.  POLICY LESSONS FROM CLEVELAND’S ECONOMIC
RESTRUCTURING
There are two sets of lessons to be learned from Cleveland’s experience with economic
restructuring.  The first set consists of eight recommendations distilled from the
Cleveland’s experience with economic restructuring that can help shape national economic
development policy.  The second set of lessons come from the way Cleveland structured
its private-public economic development organizations and executed its regional
development strategy.
Lessons for National Urban Policy
There are eight lesson  that the federal government can apply to formulating a
national urban economic development policy from Cleveland’s attempts to revitalize itself.
These lessons encompass: le rning, strategy, leadership, capacity, leverage and scale,
distress, coordination, and accountability.
1. Learning.
The federal government has a critical role to play in monitoring, evaluating and
disseminating knowledge about economic development strategies and techniques.  They
can only do this if they are an investor in either development projects or staff capacity and,
in effect, purchase a seat at the table.  An essential complementary function is providing
high quality statistical information about the functioning of regional economies.  Timely,
statistically accurate, labor force data and estimates of gross regional product for
metropolitan economies are especially needed.
Policy Lessons from Cleveland’s Economic Restructuring
Ned Hill Page 2 February 1997
2. Strategy.
The promise of federal funds can be catalytic, but the competition for those funds
must force the local economic community to place projects in a strategic context, and the
strategy must be shown to be reasonable and widely accepted by private and public actors
who makeup the economic community.  The strategy must be both benchmarked and
reviewed to see if it has worked and if it is relevant to current economic and social
conditions.
 Maintaining a long term strategic focus was critical to Cleveland’s regional
economic revitalization but the strategy had to be preceded by responses to the political
and administrative crises faced by the city of Cleveland that were revealed by the  regional
economic crisis.  The strategy had to be proceeded by a shift in city and union politics
from confrontational, distributional, populous politics to the cooperative politics of
economic development.  In Cleveland’s case two process institutions—the Round Table,
dedicated to improved racial understanding between corporate, political, and African
American leaders, and Work in Northeast Ohio, a group that works on labor management
issues—and the leadership of Mayor George Voinovich prepared the ground where the
economic development strategy proposed and sponsored by Cleveland Tomorrow, a non-
profit group composed of the corporate leadership of the region, could take root.
Cleveland’s strategy was widely accepted by its political, corporate, and union
leadership—its economic community—due in part to inter-personal connections made in
those earlier organizations and due to their vested interests in finding solutions to an
economic transition that threatened their livelihoods.  The second lesson is that the
strategy gained legitimacy, and the economy vibrancy, with major plant investments by the
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Big Three domestic automotive manufacturers, their second and third tier supplier chains,
and LTV Steel Corporation.  It is doubtful that these investments would have been made
without the combination of the sunk capitol these firms had in the region and the improved
labor-management climate.  Effective economic development strategy cannot be created in
a vacuum, or purchased from development consultants, because strategy goes far beyond
a convincing line of argument and a four-color brochure; it is the way the way strategy is
developed and implemented that makes a difference in economic performance and peoples
lives that makes a difference and this comes from leadership.
3. Leadership.
Private-public development partnerships work, but they must represent a broad
coalition of support for specific projects for the project to succeed.  That support must
consist of a combination of financial and personal involvement.  As an aside, it is
important to note that the exact composition of that partnership and who takes the lead
will differ from region to region depending on the region’s particular political and
economic cultures, the nature of corporate and institutional leadership, and the degree to
which civic infrastructure can address development issues.  Three questions need to be
answered to identify the economic development leaders of a community:
· Who can catalyze interest and action on pressing regional and local economic
development problems?
 
· Who can maintain a long term strategic focus on both the problem and
proposed solution?  and,
 
· Who can leverage resources to address those problems?
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 These three questions amount to asking: Where does the real political muscle lie?
and Does the self-interest of the leadership correspond to the long term development
interests of the community?
 There are two problems in providing economic development leadership and they
relate to two mismatches—one in time and the other in geography.  The time it takes for a
regional economy to restructure is much longer than the time horizon of politicians and,
increasingly, of corporate leadership.  The geographic mismatch is more subtle than the
timing problem.
 William Barnes and Larry Ledebur (1991) point out that there is a spatial mismatch
in two important federal systems.  There is a federal system of government goes from the
nation, to states, and then to municipalities.  The federal economic system starts at the
global level, devolves to the nation, and then drops to functional regional economies—
many of which are metropolitan areas.  The problem is that metropolitan economies are
not representative units of government and it is difficult to invest in the economic good of
the region from state and municipal government.  The promise of federal funds offers a
strong incentive for state and local governments to overcome urban-rural, city-suburban
and regional political rivalries and help overcome the mismatch in the two federal systems.
 The reason why corporate leadership is seen as an economic development resource
becomes clear when you consider the mismatch in the two federal structures.  Normally
we think of private sector involvement in development because the private sector makes
the investments that power economies.  This is a rationale for the private sector’s
leadership in development transactions, not strategic development and political activity.
Corporate leadership in development strategy is required because businesses are the only
Policy Lessons from Cleveland’s Economic Restructuring
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organizations that span regional economies.  Corporate leaders have a perspective that
spans the regional economy, but they will must have enough at stake to take the risks of
entering visible economic development politics.
 In Cleveland’s case it took ten years for economic regeneration to take place and
corporate leadership entered the arena of development politics because their economic
crisis was part and parcel of the region’s development crisis.  Superior leadership and a
reasonable strategy do not guarantee economic revitalization.  Development depends on
the way the strategy is executed and on investment.  The City of Cleveland faced an
administrative crisis in the early years of the Voinovich Administration and it did not have
the capacity to execute the development strategy.
4. Capacity.
Either local government must be especially effective in its ability to carry out a
project, or there must be a broad and deep civic infrastructure located outside of formal
government that can see projects through to completion.  Federal support maybe provided
to development capacity that lies outside of formal units of state and local government.
The Voinovich Administration dealt with its administrative crisis in two ways.   It hired
expertise from another city to run its new development department to execute the deals
that required the City’s direct involvement.  It used federally mandated planning processes
and applications to train indigenous expertise.  Finally, the region as a whole created a
deep civic infrastructure to complete development deals.
Policy Lessons from Cleveland’s Economic Restructuring
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5. Leverage and Scale.
There needs to be a high degree of local match to the federal investment for two
reasons.  First, it is an external sign that local community leaders feel that the project is a
reasonable risk and demonstrates local political commitment.  Second, it can bring a
project to sufficient scale so that it can have a demonstrable impact on local development
objectives.  However, it is unlikely that the match will be dominated by investments from
the private sector.  The match can come from other units of government, local
foundations, and in the case of development organizations that deliver services directly to
firms, from memberships once the program has proven its worth.
 In Cleveland’s case the financial involvement of county and state governments was
particularly important and there was an inadvertent rationale to the pattern of federal
involvement¾it was nearly nil when the city was politically incapacitated, it then became
rather large and then tailed off.  There was always local match but that match increased as
time wore on.  This pattern was not designed, it was a result of the federal government’s
gradual disengagement from urban development.  This implies that once a place has
demonstrated that it has the civic infrastructure to do development, and it has an
economically viable rationale based on the demonstrated competencies of its economy,
federal investments make a substantial difference in the future of a city or of a region.
 The Cleveland case demonstrates another important role of the federal government
in economic development—the federal government is a critical layer of finance that is
required to take a solution to “scale.”  This is a rather ungrammatical way of saying that it
takes a big banker to tackle large and complicated problems.  There are three reasons why
scale matters in urban economic development.  First, urban development problems are
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both large and difficult and it takes large projects to have visible and meaningful results.
Second, it is easier to attract high quality staff to larger organizations.  Finally, larger
organizations have more flexibility in terms of their financial resources and they can invest
more time on process issues and take a more strategic focus then a transactional focus in
their work.  Again, it is federal funds and guarantees, coupled with the federal
government’s ability to require leverage, that brings solutions to scale.
 The Cleveland case demonstrates three points.  First, being cut off from federal
funding due to poor performance, or being reprimanded for poor performance, can be a
powerful spur for local authorities to reform.  This was the case when the City of
Cleveland was cut off disciplined for the poor performance of its urban renewal and when
the regional housing authority was reprimanded by the federal authorities.  Second, the
federal government does not have to make politically painful choices between
communities as long as it has rules that require local match, demonstrated local capacity,
and a reasonable development strategy.  Third, federal Urban Development Action Grants
(UDAG) and Community Development Block Grants (CDBG) funds allowed the city of
Cleveland to reshape its downtown and the scale of those investments mitigated the risk
perceptions of investors.
 Making scale a reason for federal involvement in urban development brings
forward a fundamental question: Which are the urban development issues that are in the
nation’s interest and which should be the province of state, regional, and local
government?  After all, if state and county governments are not interested in investing in
their own urban areas, why should the central government?  One reason for the federal
Policy Lessons from Cleveland’s Economic Restructuring
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government’s involvement was discussed above¾to pr ide incentives to bridge the gap
between political and economic geography.  The second is distress.
6. Distress.
The federal government has a unique role to play in that it is the entity that can act
in distressed communities. There are many local conditions that are manifestations of
national problems and economic distress is one of those problems.  Whether the issue is
the effectiveness of urban educational systems, the response to changing demands for
skills in the labor market, or the impact of restructuring industries, the problem is often a
national problem that happens to be located in a specific community.  This does not mean
that the federal government has an obligation to right all that is wrong in all distressed
communities—this is an impossible and wasteful objective.  Instead, it is the federal role to
provide incentives for that community to make investments and changes that are difficult
to make and those incentives should only be made available to those communities that
have the capacity to successfully complete reasonable projects.  Those communities are
also in the best position to coordinate federal development assistance.
7. Bottom-up Coordination.
The federal government cannot coordinate all aspects of economic and community
development assistance.  This must be coordinated locally and be consistent with local
goals and objectives.  The federal government can consolidate and simplify the number of
programs; aggressively educate local officials about the existence, purpose and
requirements of these programs; and make it easier to work across federal departments.
Policy Lessons from Cleveland’s Economic Restructuring
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The federal government should provide incentives so that communities coordinate
community and economic development funding.
8. Economic Development; Not Community Development.
Economic development is a component of community development, and as such it
is tempting to recommend that federal economic and community development funds be
lumped into a large pot and local communities divide the funds up as they see fit.  This
would be a mistake for two reasons.  First, local and state politics can result in the
alleviation of distress being assigned a very low priority.  Second, combining programs
makes it very difficult to ensure accountability and it makes it very difficult to evaluate
program effectiveness and efficiency (this would damage the learning goal).  Linking
economic development and community development investments is important because
they are interdependent.  However, this should be done at the local level and federal grant
making can recognize and provide incentives for linking community and economic
development efforts.
Cleveland’s development model is based on strategically identified private-public
partnerships that focus on well-defined development goals.  Each goal is addressed by
defining more immediate objectives, which are treated as transactions, or “deals.”
(Granted, these deals are often very complicated and difficult to structure.)  The result is
that Cleveland’s model works much less well on community development objectives (as
opposed to economic development objectives), process issues where the politics are messy
and goals and products are less tangible, and city-specific redistributive objectives.  These
will forever remain within the realm of politics and require the ongoing involvement of
some higher level of government.
Policy Lessons from Cleveland’s Economic Restructuring
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The Structure of Cleveland-style Economic Development
There are additional lessons from Cleveland-style economic development, however
the implications are not directly relevant to federal policy, but are critical parts of the
Cleveland approach to development.  They relate to the way the development process is
organized and controlled and are a product of the region’s political culture and experience.
Cleveland’s development process began with a strategic plan that was commissioned by a
small group that represented the largest employers in the region and was broadly adopted
by an expanded group of corporate leadership, who in-turn sold the strategy to political
and other pinion leaders.
This plan identified strategic objectives that needed to be addressed if the economy
of the region was to change.  These are investments that the private market is often
unwilling to make without some form of assistance or encouragement, either due to their
risk or to the public goods nature of the product (such as improved labor-management
relations, manufacturing extension programs, or new civic buildings¾even if they are to
be privately controlled such as sports arenas and shopping malls).  The agenda was
developed with the consent of the mayor and it was adopted by the county commissioners,
governor, state and Congressional legislative delegations.  Pursuit of the long term agenda
was left to Cleveland Tomorrow as the intermediary, coordinating, institution.  It is
doubtful whether this approach could work in a purely opportunistic, deal driven,
development environment, as opposed to a strategically driven environment.
Each objective was addressed by first forming an institution closely resembling a
community based development organization (CBO) whose purpose was to address the
issue at hand—this is even true of Cleveland Tomorrow, the organization formed to
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maintain the development agenda of the corporate leadership.  The development
organization is supported by a combination of foundation, corporate, and governmental
funding.  The government funding is project related, while the continuing funding comes
from the other sources.  The corporate funding can take two forms—initial corporate
grant, that are often followed by membership fees.  Seed funding by local foundations and
corporations are critical to the success of this model as these funds act as capital.  The
organization is often temporarily housed inside of some other organization and once it has
identified a product or a deal it is spun out of the sponsoring organization (this is
especially true of Cleveland Tomorrow, which is an extremely flat organization).
The development organization is controlled by a board that has significant direct
representation by the private sector or by the private sector’s representatives and the
board’s membership must have a direct stake in the issue that the organization addresses.
Often the development issue is regional in scope and formal political representation on the
organization’s board is minimal, but the organization remains very respectful of the power
of formal government and cognizant of the needs of elected officials.  The result is that the
Cleveland development model has created, and supported, a very dense professional civic
infrastructure.  Because the strategic plan that has been followed has three distinct
components—regional development organizations, spatially based (neighborhood)
commercial and industrial development organizations, and neighborhood development
organizations that specialize in housing production—three distinct networks of CBOs
exist.
This model has produced two results.  First, civic development projects have been
privatized and largely taken outside of formal politics.  This is due to the nature of the
Policy Lessons from Cleveland’s Economic Restructuring
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development organizations and to the condition of the City of Cleveland’s bureaucracy in
the early 1980s when this development effort began.  Many of the directors, members and
staff of these organizations live outside of Cleveland, or the organizations service firms
that are located both inside and outside of the city.  This means that organizations, of
necessity, begin to take on a regional perspective.  The development effort was located
outside of City Hall for a second reason.  In the late 1970s and early 1980s the City faced
an administrative crisis and did not have the capacity to execute the strategy, even though
the City’s Economic Development Department did develop the capacity to complete
complicated financial packages under the UDAG program by the mid-1980s.  The second
result of the organizational structure of Cleveland’s development effort is that there is an
ever present danger in the civic infrastructure becoming what Janis Purdy calls “the civic
underbrush.”
There is a need for mediating institutions to organize the claims for resources made
by the three sets of organizations.  The foundations and Cleveland Tomorrow acted as the
mediating bodies until the number of organizations and multiplicity of networks became
too dense.  Recently, the foundations have begun forming “clearinghouses” to sit on top of
each network, to rationalize claims made on resources.  Neighborhood Progress
Incorporated sits on top of the CBOs that produce housing.  The Growth Association
sponsors an effort that is attempting to mediate the regional employment training system.
Cleveland Tomorrow and the Growth Association mediate the regional development and
development research organizations.  At present there is no holding company at work
among the CBOs engaged in commercial and industrial activities.
Policy Lessons from Cleveland’s Economic Restructuring
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The strength of this development model is that the civic infrastructure is composed
of professionals who are familiar with each other and work well together, allowing them
to broker and complete deals, who work within the strategic framework that is maintained
by the Cleveland and Gund Foundations, Cleveland Tomorrow, and the leadership of the
Greater Cleveland Growth Association¾the boards of all of these organizations have
significant, and often overlapping, membership from the region’s elite corporations and
law firms.  The development organizations are also production, or goal, oriented.  In this
regard they have adopted a corporate operational culture.  The reality of this model is that
it is top-down in structure and lies outside of formal political process and can be appear to
be exclusionary to those without access to one of the networks.  The Cleveland model can
also appear to be monolithic to those who do not agree with the overarching development
goals.  The Cleveland model depends upon sharing credit, cooperation, and fundamentally
on knowing the needs of the formal political system and finding ways to meet those needs.
This is a cultural understanding and it recognizes the power of the mediating institutions.
The Cleveland model also involves corporate leadership in real decision making
roles, not as civic figureheads that pass on staff developed projects.  They invest personal
funds in some of the projects and corporate funds in many others, but these investments
always follow the personal expenditure of time and effort on the project by either
themselves or a peer.  This structure is evident in statements the first two executive
directors of Cleveland Tomorrow made to a Harvard Business School case-writing team
(Austin, 1996a, p.9).  The first director, Bill Seelbach, said that:
The staff brings analysis, alternatives, and recommendations to the Officers’ Group
(the executive committee of Cleveland Tomorrow).  The Officers’ Group, in turn,
make recommendations to the full board, and then the board votes on it.  That is in
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contrast to many organizations where, frankly, the agenda is set by the staff, and the
programs are directed and run by full-time staff.
Richard Shatten, the second director, recounted a lesson he learned from Mort Mandel,
one of the CEOs who founded Cleveland Tomorrow.  Shatten reported that Mandel told
him after a meeting where Shatten told Cleveland Tomorrow’s board not to worry about
an issue because he had dealt with it:
You (as executive director) have to involve me (as a member), because involvement
leads to understanding.  Understanding leads to commitment.  Unless I’m involved,
I can’t be committed, and if I’m not committed, I’m never going to give you any
money.
There are two major weakness to Cleveland’s model of development.  It can break
down if there is excessive credit claiming on the part of a political leader that the civic
infrastructure cannot accommodate, or if there is organizational rivalry that cannot be
mediated.  It can also break down if the balance between downtown development—which
is of regional interest but formal control over land use resides with the City of Cleveland—
and neighborhood development¾which is very important to the city’s political leadership
but requires funds that are often under corporate control¾is upse .
There is a reality that must be faced when discussing the impact of federal
economic development policies on any region in the nation.  Formal economic
development spending is small compared to the (often unintended) developmental impact
of four major areas of federal spending: federal highway and infrastructure spending, the
capital gains treatment of housing, the home mortgage interest deduction from federal
income taxes, and federal research and development spending and military procurement.
In their present form all work against established urban areas.  As Robert Jaquay said:
“The major role that the federal government plays in our (Cleveland’s) economy is the
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unintended consequences of highway funding and tax policies—especially the capital gains
tax treatment of housing and the mortgage interest deduction—which changes the spatial
form of the region. ... Efforts at urban economic development make sense, but they are
not large enough to counter the other subsidies.”
The next section of the paper contains the Cleveland case study.  First, the
outcomes from the region’s decade-long recovery are documented.  The change in the
political-economic culture of the region that served as the foundation of the economic
development strategy is discussed in the third section.1  The fourth section describes the
process by which the region undertook its restructuring, paying particular attention to the
role of the federal government.
                                         
1This paper is partially based on seven interviews I conducted in late August and early September, 1995
with people who led, or staffed, organizations that were important to the city’s revitalization efforts and
were in positions to work with broad cross-sections of the corporate and civic communities.  William
Bryant was the chief executive of the Greater Cleveland Growth Association during most of the period
covered.  Stephen Gage is President of the Cleveland Advanced Manufacturing Program (CAMP).  Robert
Jaquay was an Executive Assistant to Mayor George Voinovich.  Christopher Johnson was with the State
of Ohio’s Economic Development Department in the early days of Governor Celeste’s Administration, he
then moved to Cleveland where he was the first director of the Rock and Role Hall of Fame and latter
moved on to become the Director of Mid-Town Corridor, Inc.  Janis Purdy was part of the team that
established Cleveland’s first economic development department under Mayor Voinovich.  She currently is
Executive Director of the Citizen’s League of Greater Cleveland.  Richard Shatten was Executive Director
of Cleveland Tomorrow.  David Sweet is Dean of the Levin College of Urban Affairs and held that
position throughout most of the time period covered by this paper.
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II.  REVITALIZED CLEVELAND, NOT COMEBACK CLEVELAND:
FEDERAL AND LOCAL FORCES THAT REBUILT A REGION
Comeback Cleveland By The Numbers
What does “Comeback” mean?  It’s largely physical development focused
on the downtown; that’s what the feds gave us the money for.
¾Janis Purdy, Executive Director, The Citizens League
Cleveland’s “comeback” is complex and the perception of the successes that the city and
region have experienced in developing a new economy has been hurt by the very term that
has been used in the promotional effort—comeback.  The word has generated
unreasonable standards for success, even though it has proven to be both a winning
marketing tag line and a successful piece of alliteration.  Comeback implies returning to
what was.  Cleveland is not a comeback city or region, it can never become one, and
should not aspire to become one.  America’s role in the global economy changed, and with
it, so has Cleveland’s role in the national economy.  Like Humpty Dumpty, the old
economy cannot be put back together again.
What would be required to produce comeback Cleveland?  The region would have
to return to being a prosperous center of heavy industrial production as of old; where
poorly educated, semi-skilled, labor can share in the oligopoly profits of corporations that
are insulated from serious domestic or international competition.  This, of course, will not
reoccur in the foreseeable future because the tremendous market power of those
corporations has been reduced; oligopoly profits have decayed in concert with their loss of
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market power; and, as oligopoly profits have declined so have the rents available to labor.2
If not Comeback Cleveland, then what?  Cleveland’s economy is revitalizing. Downtown
Cleveland witnessed a wave of building since 1983.  The unemployment rate shows that
the regional economy has successfully changed.  However, an index of employment
growth and data on poverty indicate that work remains to be done.  Each of these
indicators of economic restructuring are examined in his section.
Downtown Construction
From 1980 to 1996 building construction contracts let in downtown Cleveland
totaled about $3.7 billion in 1994 real dollars.  (Table 1)  Nearly 60 percent of this amount
was invested in buildings that were dedicated to office and retail activities and 21 percent
were invested in entertainment or visitor attractions.  Another indicator of the rebound of
Cleveland’s downtown is the real (inflation adjusted) increase in property values.  The real
value of private property holdings in 1979 was $1.286 billion in 1994 dollars.  The value
in 1990 was $2.7 billion.3
There is little question that this investment re-made the public face of the
downtown and that the public sector participated substantially in the financing of these
projects in the form of various subsidies, write-downs, and tax breaks.  The largest
investors were county and state governments, followed by the City and federal
                                         
2One definition of an economic rent is any above market return that is garnered through market power.
The economic profit of a firm and its accounting profit differ by the sum of the rents.  To an accountant
profit is returns to stockholders and retained earnings.  To an economist profit are these items plus rents.
3 Bingham and Kalich (1996) report that the assessed value of real property, in 1987 dollars, in 1979 was
$334 million at a 35 percent assessment rate and the real value in 1990 was $705 million.  To obtain the
estimated market value in each year, in 1994 dollars, I first inflated these dollars amounts and then
divided by the assessment ratio, 35 percent.
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governments.  There is no single accounting available of the investments made by each
governmental unit and I was not able to find an accounting of the various building projects
that identified the participation of each unit of government, the not-for-profit sector and
private investors.  But
examples are available.
Northcoast
Development Corporation
is the not-for-profit
organization that controls
the Northcoast Harbor
site, home to the Rock
Hall and Great Lakes
Science Center Museum.
The initial $10 million
investment in Northcoast
Harbor came from the
State’s capital budget, and
accounted for 55 percent
of the project investments
as of 1991.  The State
funds were linked to an early grant from the Economic Development Administration to
make the harbor a reality.  Thirteen percent came from federal sources, and 6 percent from
county and city government.  Corporate donations accounted for 10 percent and local
Table 1
Annual Spending on Major Building
Projects in Downtown Cleveland
from 1980 to 1996
Reported Contract Amount
Current 1994 Real
Dollar Dollar
Year (million) (million)
1980 64.5 106.9
1981 22.5 35.4
1982 12.4 18.8
1983 137.8 204.8
1984 124.0 178.9
1985 236.0 331.8
1986 69.9 96.9
1987 98.5 132.6
1988 128.2 166.5
1989 60.3 74.9
1990 672.2 789.8
1991 689.4 772.1
1992 16.6 17.9
1993 0 0
1994 401.4 401.4
1995 268.9 268.9
1996 244.9 244.9
TOTAL 3,160.5         3,700.3         
Sources: Greater Cleveland Growth Association
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foundations contributed 10 percent.4  Once the inner harbor was completed, the Rock
Hall’s architect selected the harbor as its location.  The reported contract amount for the
Hall was $45 million and Cleveland’s alternative newspaper, The Free Times, reported
that the exhibits cost $22 million.5  The State of Ohio put in place the first traunche of
funding for the Hall with an $8 million capital grant and $64 million in bonds were issued,
two-thirds by the County’s Port Authority, one-sixth by the County and a matching
amount by the City.  These bonds are to be repaid in part by tax increment financing from
Tower City’s property taxes, the County hotel bed tax, and admissions fees.6
Tower City Center is one of the two cornerstone projects in Cleveland’s
downtown redevelopment.  It was a high risk venture and was the project that, in the
words of Janis Purdy, “taught us how to put together packages.”  (Purdy was one of the
original members of Voinovich’s new Economic Development Department).  Tower City
was first announced in 1985, construction began in 1987 and the project opened in 1990.
The project received five UDAGs valued at $31.5 million and at least $54 million in
transportation grants from federal and state sources.7  The project is widely reported to
have let construction contracts valued at $400 million.  Tower City was of such size and
complexity that it took deep pockets to make the project possible, and the bulk of the
patient public money came from the federal government.  Most other projects in
                                         
4 Cleveland Tomorrow, Sources of Funds 1982-1991 (mimeo).
5 The contract amount was reported by the Growth Association and the figure on the exhibits was reported
by Roldo Bartimole in “Corporate Rock and Roll,” The Free Times (August 30, 1995) p. 11.
6 Bartimole, Free Times.
7 See Keating, Krumholz and Metzger (1995) for a full discussion of the use of UDAGs in Cleveland.
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Cleveland’s downtown, however, received their funding from State and County
Governments.  Playhouse Square and Gateway are good examples.
The federal government did not directly participate in the development of
Playhouse Square.  The County and City provided nearly half of the funds¾primarily the
County.  The State contributed nearly a quarter of the funding, using the bonding
authority of the higher education budget as the shell to transfer the funds.  The final 20
percent came from corporate contributions (13 percent) and local foundations (7 percent).
Gateway is a half billion dollar sports complex and the final sources of funding are
not yet clear.  The bulk of the funds come from a county-wide sin tax that is used to retire
bonds issued by the County government.  Infrastructure finance came from gasoline taxes
and from a state-wide infrastructure bond issue called Issue 2.  The City of Cleveland also
abated property taxes as a development incentive.  The federal government contributed
indirectly by allowing the issuance of tax free bonds for the project.  Funds from loges and
club seats and naming rights completed the financing.  Unfortunately, the not-for-profit
development entity that holds title to the complex is insolvent due to $22 million in cost
overruns and neither the final tally, nor the final financial structure, of this project are
known.
There are two points to be made from all of this detail.  First, doing capital
intensive civic projects¾which is what many of the visitor destination projects are¾is
expensive, risky, and requires spreading the risk among many participants.  In all of these
cases participation started with a risk-taking unit of government.  In the case of the Rock
Hall the governments were the State of Ohio with its $10 million grant for the harbor and
their initial capital grant of $8 million for the Hall itself and the federal government in the
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form of the grant from the Economic Development Administration.  This was due to the
personal involvement of Governor Celeste.  Playhouse Square was made possible due to
risk taking on the part of the County Commissioners, as is the case with Gateway.  Tower
City was a political risk taken by the federal government.  Yet, in each case there was a
project advocate who lobbied for the grants.  The Playhouse project was initiated by three
civic activists, who were latter supported by the Cleveland Foundation and Cleveland
Tomorrow.   The Hall of Fame was advocated by then-mayor Voinovich.  Gateway was
initiated by Cleveland Tomorrow and the mayoral administrations of Voinovich and
White, but the County Commissioners and the State of Ohio made the project happen
under the threat of the Indians leaving the region.
Public participation continued in private sector projects as well. Key Tower,
headquarters to KeyCorp, received historical restoration tax credits, a UDAG, and tax
abatement.  Most other commercial buildings completed after the mid-1980s have received
property tax abatement.  The city benefits because it receives wage tax revenue from the
workers (a former city finance director told me that getting the Cavaliers downtown was a
victory for the city because the major cost of the project was borne by county taxpayers
and the city received the wage taxes).  Could these projects have succeeded without the
public’s participation?  The complicated early projects, such as Tower City and Key
Tower, most likely would not have been undertaken.  It is highly unlikely that Gateway
could have been built with private participation due to the fierce inter-city competition for
sports franchises, and the waterfront projects could only work with public money.
It is also very likely that these projects secured the financial health of the City
government because approximately 40 percent of the city’s general operating budget
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comes from suburban wage tax payers.8  If the employment base were lost in downtown
Cleveland the City’s finances would markedly deteriorate.  Granted, much of the
development has been financed through property tax abatements that primarily affect the
financing of the city’s schools.  The system of public finance encourages the city to abate
to garner wage taxes, even though the abatements might harm the financial structure of
the public school system.  The real issue at hand is whether or not the development
downtown would have taken place without the public subsidies and there is no way to
know the answer to this question.  In all likelihood the early projects—such as Tower City
and the sports arenas—would not have been built which would have changed risk
perceptions for the downtown investments that followed.
What has been the impact of these projects on the core of the city?  Many of the
office projects opened their doors just as a number of prominent downtown employers
were cutting back employment in drives to improve their efficiency and in reaction to the
1990 recession.  Ameritrust merged with Society Bank, which latter merged with Albany’s
KeyCorp.  Ameritech, formerly Ohio Bell, experienced a long and deep set of layoffs to
improve its competitive position, as did East Ohio Gas Company.  And a long-time
downtown bellwether company, BP, went through a painful rationalization that had
profound effects on its Cleveland operations.  All of these layoffs reflect national and
international market conditions and were independent of local actions.  However, these
cutbacks, combined with the boost in the supply of office space, increased the local
                                         
8 Steven Strnisha at an April 2, 1995 forum at Cleveland State University that “upwards to 70 percent of
the income taxes paid … are actually paid by suburbanites.”  The City of Cleveland city gets almost 60
percent of its operating budget from the wage tax.  The suburban share (70 percent) of the wage tax’s
share of the operating budget (60 percent) is 42 percent of the operating budget.  See Bingham and Kalich
(1996) for the full quote.
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vacancy rate for downtown office space from approximately 8 percent to a range from 17
percent to above 20 percent through much of the early 1990s.  Most of the new office
space that was filled, with two prominent exceptions, came from local firms that moved
from existing downtown office space.  The exceptions were the United Church of Christ,
which moved its headquarters form New York City to Cleveland, and KeyCorp.  KeyCorp
has increasingly centralized its operations in Cleveland, moving activities out of a number
of locations, including Albany, New York where KeyCorp was headquartered before its
merger with Society Bank.  The firm has become the largest employer in the downtown
area and its planned expansions are expected to bring the vacancy rate down to the mid-
teens, assuming that new buildings are not constructed.
Unemployment Rate
The unemployment rate makes an unabashed case for the dramatic recovery of the
regional economy, defined as the Cleveland-Akron-Lorain-Elyria (CALE) Consolidated
Metropolitan Area (CMSA).9  The difference between the state and national
unemployment rates displayed in Figure 1 were constructed by subtracting the national
unemployment rate from the rate for the state of Ohio and the CMSA respectively.  If the
percentage point difference is positive, the local unemployment rates are greater than the
national rate and, if negative they are lower than the national rate.
                                                                                                                   
9 The Cleveland PMSA increased from four counties to six in the early 1990s.  It now includes Ashtabula,
Cuyahoga,  Geauga, Lake, Lorain, and Medina Counties.  The CMSA adds Portage and Summit Counties
to this list.  I have used data from the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services to adjust earlier data to match
the new, expanded, geography.
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From 1972 to 1979 the unemployment rate for the CMSA was lower then that of
the State of Ohio, which was, in turn, below the rate for the nation¾1979 was also the
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year of peak employment in the region.  The economy crashed in 1979, bottomed out in
1983, and then began an unsteady recovery until 1986.  The recovery was firmly
established after 1986.  The unemployment rate for the nation was significantly below that
of both the CMSA and state for a decade, from 1979 to 1989.  Generally, the
unemployment rate for the CMSA was below that of the state until 1993, and fell below
the national rate in 1989.  This latter event marked the recovery of the regional economy.
The state’s unemployment rate fell below the national rate in 1991.
Movements in the unemployment rate mark the three of the four periods of recent
economic history, the fourth period is only evident when employment figures are
examined.  The regional economy moved cyclically, in concert with the national economy,
from 1972 to 1979, but signs of structural problems were evident.  The economy crashed
in 1979, bottoming out in 1983, and did not stabilize until 1986, when the restructured
economy was firmly in place.
Employment
The flip side of the region’s economic recovery is marked by employment growth.
To best display fluctuations in the number of people employed, I constructed an
employment index using the annual average number of people employed in 1979 as the
base of the index (1979 was chosen because it was the employment peak of the old
Cleveland economy).  The index can be interpreted as the percentage point difference in a
given period’s level of employment from the 1979 level.  If the index is below 100,
employment is less than it was in 1979; if above 100, the number of jobs is greater than in
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1979.  The employment growth rate can be observed by looking at the slope of the index,
or changes in the position of the index, between any two points in time.  Data are not
displayed for the state of Ohio; instead
they are displayed for Ohio less the
Cleveland-Akron-Elyria-Lorain CMSA.
This is labeled as the “other Ohio” in
Figure 2.
Four distinct periods are evident
in the second figure: before 1979, 1979
to 1983, 1983 to 1989, and 1989 to
1995.  The first time period is marked
by generally positive employment
growth rates that move with the
national business cycle, and the growth
rates for CALE and the other Ohio
move together.  The decline of Ohio’s
regional economies from 1979 to 1983
is evident, but the parts of the state that
are located outside of Northeast Ohio
pull out of the decline a year before the
region, and the other Ohio’s decline is
not as deep as in Northeast Ohio.  The
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nation as a whole suffered a slow-down
in employment growth, but never an
absolute annual decline, over this time
period.  From 1983 to 1989 the regional
economy slowly recovered the number
of jobs it had in 1979 and resumed a
growth track that roughly paralleled the
state and nation until 1989 when the
regional economy appears to have
stalled.  Figure 3 depicts the monthly
employment index from January 1990
to September 1996.  It is designed to
more closely examine the stall in
regional employment job growth.
Nationally, the recession of
1990 was relatively shallow
(unemployment did not increase as
dramatically as it did in past recessions)
and the recovery became notorious as
the “jobless” recovery.  Northeast Ohio
entered the recession late, because the
national recession was triggered by
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regional events that were located outside of the Midwest.10  The m sage contained in
Figure 3 is clear: during the most recent business cycle employment growth for the rest of
the state mirrored that of the nation, it is just starting from a lower base; employment
growth in the CMSA has largely stagnated.  The nation began to pull out of the recession
in the early 1993; the recovery in the “other Ohio” began in late 1994 and has continued
until late in 1996.  The recovery in the CMSA began a year latter.  Movements in the
employment index for the CMSA over the entire period covered in Figure 3 largely
represent seasonal fluctuations in hiring (employment peaks in the summer months) until
the recovery set in April of 1994.  Of concern is the increasing gap in the employment
index between the “other Ohio” and the CMSA.  There is an apparent inconsistency when
the unemployment rate for the region and the employment growth data are compared.
The unemployment rates make an unabashed case for “comeback Cleveland,” while the
employment growth data indicate that the regional economy has stagnated.  The only way
in which these two sets of data can be reconciled is by stating that a large share of the
population is existing outside of the labor force.  One indicator of this would be the
incidence of poverty in Cuyahoga County, which is the county that contains the City of
Cleveland.
                                         
10First, the savings and loan industry collapsed and this was followed cutbacks in defense spending, which
in turn accelerated the crash of over-built commercial and residential real estate markets¾first in the
Southwest, then in southern California, and finally in New England.  The recession was like a pin-ball
rattling around the country taking regional economies down as it came crashing through a region-specific
industry.. It was only after these regional forces accumulated, and purchases of consumer durable goods
slowed, that the recession affected the industrial heartland.
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Poverty
George Zeller, of Cleveland’s Council of
Economic Opportunity, estimates the number of people
who have incomes that are below the poverty line, and
the percent of the population that has incomes below
the poverty line for Cuyahoga County.  Figure 4
reproduces Zeller’s estimates from 1980 to 1995.  The
poverty estimates roughly track the employment index
that was displayed in Figure 2.  The estimated number
of poor individuals climbed rapidly from 1980 to 1983.
The number continued to increase, but at a much
slower rate until 1989, when it dipped a bit.  The
number of poor climber once again with the recession
in the early 1990s and began to drop in absolute
numbers in 1993.  The percent of the County’s
population that is poor closely tracked the number of
poor individuals.  It is clear from these data that the
incidence of poverty is closely connected to job
formation.  Three reports that reached similar
conclusions were released in the mid-1990s.
Three Recent Reports
Leadership Cleveland’s 1996 class titled its economy day: Clevelan ¾ Beyond the
Glitz.  The title is an acknowledgment of the reality of the region’s recovery and
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transition.  The title of the training session is also a clear sign of emotional security
because it marks a start of an honest evaluation of the state of the region.  A title that
indicated an incomplete comeback would have been unthinkable a few years ago.11  Three
reports made available in 1994 detailed the extent of the economic transition: one by the
Citizen’s League of Greater Cleveland, one by researchers at Wayne State and Cleveland
State Universities, and the third by consultants to the Greater Cleveland Growth
Association.  All indicate that the economic transition has had uneven impacts on the
region.
The Citizen League reported measured the region’s progress in five broad areas
(amenities, people, education, government, and economic performance) against thirteen
bench-mark regions. 12  Three of these regions were chosen because they are similar to
Cleveland (Detroit, Pittsburgh, and St. Louis), seven were seen as national role models
(Atlanta, Charlotte, Cincinnati, Indianapolis, Minneapolis, Phoenix, and Seattle), and three
were viewed as stable regional centers (Boston, Chicago, and San Francisco).  The results
indicates that the region’s efforts at revitalization have been mixed.  Greater Cleveland
ranked first in amenities—the index is composed of measures of cultural opportunities
and leisure activities, seventh in people—the index measures poverty, crime, health,
environmental quality and racial integration, ighth in education—the index measures
educational opportunities and workforce preparedness, ninth in government—the index
                                         
11 Essayist Calvin Trillin, in his book American Fried (1970), describes the problem of
“rubaphobia”¾fear people have of being thought of being unsophisticated and a rube.  In his latest book
(Too Soon To Tell) he extended this concept from restaurant selection to economic development, see his
essay “Return of the Rubes.”
12 Citizens League of Greater Cleveland (1994a, 1994b).
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measures political participation and accountability of leadership, and thirteenth in
economic performance—only Detroit was lower.
Wayne State University’s Harold Wolman and Coit Ford, and I published a paper
that examined the economic performance of the residents of central cities, and their
metropolitan areas, that were economically distressed in 1980 in 1990.13  We used a panel
of experts to identify those places that were distressed in 1980 and had a reputation of
having revitalized over the following decade.  We then measured the economic well being
of their residents using the 1990 Census of Population and compared the performance of
those places that reportedly had successfully revitalized with those that did not have this
reputation, but were distressed in 1980.  Cleveland was one of the cities that was reputed
to have revitalized.  It did not perform well.
The unemployment rate in the city of Cleveland increased by 3.9 percentage points
over the decade, versus an average increase 1.3 percentage points for the “unsuccessful
cities;” median household income in Cleveland (unadjusted for inflation) increased by
45.2 percent, compared to 76.8 percent for the “unsuccessful” group; the percentage
change in per capita income was 60.5 percent in Cleveland, compared to 87.6 percent for
the comparison group; the percentage of the population below the poverty line increased
by 6.6 percentage points, compared to 2.9 percentage points for the reference group; and
the labor force participation rate increased by 0.3 percentage points in Cleveland,
compared to an average increase of 2.7 percentage points for the “unsuccessful” cities.
The results for the metropolitan area were similar.  We concluded that, with the
                                         
13 Wolman, Ford and Hill (1994).
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exceptions of Atlanta, Baltimore and Boston, the reportedly revitalized cities performed
no better, and in many cases much worse, than cities that were equally distressed in 1980.
The Greater Cleveland Growth Association reviewed approximately 100 studies
prepared on various aspects of the regional economy since the early 1980s, interviewed
more than 50 Cleveland leaders to assess the progress of the community and is using the
results to reorient its mission.14  The executive summary of the report states that there
have been marked “gains in physical infrastructure, ‘livability’, and civic image/attitude
during the 1980s,” and that “while the local economy bottomed out in 1983, more growth
is needed … notably: economic performance remains below average, but the gap has
narrowed, manufacturing concentration heightened the region’s vulnerability, but service
sector slowness has been as damaging as a manufacturing decline, [and] the urban center
has underperformed the region.”  This is a notably honest evaluation of the state of the
region, and of the city’s position within the region.
The three reports indicate that the economic benefits from the restructuring of the
regional economy have been unequally earned or distributed.  Much of this result reflects
national patterns in the income distribution, rates of return to educational attainment, and
the industrial composition of the regional economy.  There are two ways of viewing the
major development problem that Greater Cleveland faces—from the demand and supply
sides of the labor market. The most important measure of the health of a local economy is
its ability to grow jobs¾Greater Cleveland has fallen behind the nation and state.  The
problem did not lie in the behavior of the economy during the 1990 recession, it lies with
                                         
14 Greater Cleveland Growth Association (1995).
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the region’s industrial base.  However, the world does not directly demand local labor,
instead it demands locally produced goods and services.
The gap in employment generation occurred from 1983 to 1988, as the nation
recovered from the earlier recession.  From 1983 to 1988 the fast growing industries in the
nation were non-bank financial services, electronics and software industries connected to
defense and microelectronics, and health care.  Greater Cleveland is relatively weak in all
of these sectors, with the exception of health care.  The core of the region’s industrial base
is made up of mature manufacturing industries and their headquarters operations.  The
Greater Cleveland region is solidly rooted in manufacturing, and its service sector
primarily services manufacturing.  As manufacturing is slow growing, so is demand for
labor in the region.15  While the nation was expanding employment in newer service
industries, firms in this region were investing in capital and restructuring their operations
to increase productivity.  Productivity increased; employment did not.
The region’s economy is built upon a foundation of steel, automobiles, paints, and
chemicals.16  Development in the region depends not just on entrepreneurs but on the
                                         
15Ten percent of U.S. employment in 1992 was in durable goods manufacturing; the percentage in the
CMSA is 15 percent.  The employment base of the CMSA is defined as those industrial sectors where the
region has a greater proportion of its employment than does the nation.  This is measured by calculating
the ratio of the regional share of employment in a given sector to the national share of employment in the
same sector¾this is called the location quotient.  The location quotient (LQ) for durable goods
manufacturing is 1.51; personal services is at 1.40 and accounts for nearly 19 percent of local
employment; social services is at 1.31 which is generated by the large hospital sector, information and
research services has a LQ of 1.09 and 8 percent of local employment; non-durable goods manufacturing
and non-financial producer services is at 1.07; and wholesale and retail trade are at 1.03.  The banking
industry (financial producers services) accounts for 4.1 percent of local employment and has a LQ of 0.97
and rounds out the economic base of the region.
16Hill (1994, 1995) and Hill, Rittenhouse and Allison (1994). For an extended discussion of Cleveland’s
economic history see Hill (1995) and Hill, Rittenhouse and Allison (1994).  James E. Austin and his
associates (Austin and Strimling 1996a, b and Elias and Austin 1996) segment Cleveland’s recent
development history.  They write that Cleveland responded to a crisis from 1979 to 1988, the years 1989
to 1996 was a building period and that new and largely social issues are the challenges of the future.
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economic vitality of these central activities and the relationship of other industries to this
core.  There are two other components of the region’s industrial core.  First, industries
that have either corporate or divisional headquarters and production activities in the
region.  This is true of greeting cards, petroleum refining, blast furnaces and basic steel
products, electric lighting and wiring, paints and allied products, non-plastic plumbing and
heating products, drug stores and proprietary stores, and automobile parking.  Second,
metal working industries are well-represented in the core, which can be explained by the
presence of competitive integrated steel mills as sources of supply and durable goods
manufacturers as customers.
The supply side view of the performance of the regional labor market rests on the
observation that the region as a whole has a level of educational attainment that lags
behind both its competitor and bench-mark regions.  The level of educational attainment in
the region is unacceptably low compared to its competitor regions despite the fact that
Northeast Ohio’s economy remains rooted in sectors of the economy that have
traditionally been a haven for people with relatively low levels of educational attainment.
The Greater Cleveland region is saddled with a blue-collar legacy in terms of
educational attainment.  High performance blue collar workplaces are looking for better
educated and skilled workers, possessing what has become known as the “extended
basics” of manual dexterity, reasoning, interpersonal skills, working as a team member,
using information systems, setting priorities, and personal work behaviors in their new
hires.17  Differences in rates of return to different levels of education are solid indicators of
                                                                                                                   
17Packer and Wirt (1992)  p.58.  The research on the requirements of “high performance” workplaces was
completed for the SCANS reports.  SCANS was a project of the US Department of Labor and represents
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what labor markets judge to be educational characteristics that are either surplus or in
short supply.  During the 1980s rates of return increased for those who went beyond
secondary school and declined for those who did not.
The good news is that “only” 23.7 percent of the adult population terminated their
education before they graduated from high school, the CMSA is just above the median
metropolitan area in the nation on this score.  (Table 2)  The region is also far above the
median in terms of the share of the population that stopped their education at the
secondary school level.  These are the two groups that lost ground in terms of real income
over the past decade and a half.  Nearly one out of five adults in Cleveland’s CMSA has a
college degree.  This is below the national metropolitan average, but above the median.
Of greatest importance to a region that specializes in production, and aspires to
create high performance workplaces, is the percent of adults who have gone beyond
                                                                                                                   
the Secretary’s Commission on Achieving Necessary Skills.  The three critical reports are What Work
Requires of Schools (1991), Learning a Living (1992), and Skills and Tasks for Jobs (1992).
Table 2
Percent Distribution of Educational Attainment
Ages 25 Years and Older
Terminal CALE Metropolitan
Attainment % Dist Rank* Average** Median
College Degree 19.0% 134 22.5% 18.8%
Some College 23.9% 184 25.9% 25.6%
High School 33.4% 84 28.6% 30.6%
Dropout 23.7% 144 23.0% 23.8%
Source: 1990 Census of Population, PUMS
* Among 284 metropolitan areas
** Weighted average of all metropolitan areas
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secondary school but do not have four-year college degrees.  The median is 25.6 percent
of the adult population and the weighted average is 25.9 percent.  Cleveland is two full
percentage points behind the average, with 23.9 percent, and sits in 184th place out of 284
metropolitan areas.  The reason Cleveland lags is due to the proportions of adults who
either dropout, or are satisfied with the returns from a secondary school degree.
How then does the Greater Cleveland region compare with both its benchmark
regions and its competitors?  Table 3 lists all of the metropolitan regions that were used by
the Citizens League as benchmarks and also includes metropolitan regions in adjoining
states that can be viewed as competitors.  There are four groups of metropolitan regions in
the list: three MSAs are international economic centers, seven are regional economic
capitals, two are similar industrial metropolitan areas, and seven are regional competitors
to Cleveland.  The international economic centers are: Boston, Chicago, and San
Francisco.  The regional economic capitals are: Atlanta, Charlotte, Dallas, Denver,
Minneapolis, Phoenix, and Seattle.  The two industrial metropolitan areas are Detroit and
St. Louis.  And the regional competitors are: Buffalo, Cincinnati, Columbus, Dayton,
Indianapolis, Louisville, and Pittsburgh (Detroit can also be viewed as a regional
competitor).
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Table 3 contains an index of  educational attainment of the adult (age 25 and
above) population.  Each of the 284 metropolitan areas in the nation was ranked according
to the percentage of the population that held a college degree in 1990 in descending order.
Then, a similar rank order was created based on the percentage of the population that had
some college education, but had not completed college.  Two-thirds of the index weight
was given to the rank ordering of the percentage of the population that has some post-
secondary education, but did not complete college and one-third of the weight was given
Table 3
Educated Labor Supply Index
Population Age 25 Years or Greater in 1990
For 20 Metropolitan Areas
Ranked Among 284 Metro Areas
Metro Area Index
Seattle 6
Denver 15
San Francisco 16
Phoenix 18
Minneapolis 28
Dallas 35
Atlanta 79
Detroit 92
Chicago 113
Charlotte 116
St. Louis 133
Boston 145
Dayton 148
Columbus 152
Indianapolis 163
Buffalo 164
Cincinnati 179
Cleveland 183
Louisville 191
Pittsburgh 233
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to each MSA’s rank in the percentage of the adult population that graduated from college.
The metropolitan areas in the table are listed according to their score.
The Cleveland CMSA is third from the bottom on all of the indices.  It ranks 183
out of 284 metropolitan areas on the third index, trailed only by Louisville and Pittsburgh.
All of the MSAs in the surrounding region, the Rust Belt, are at the bottom of this group
of twenty regions, with the exception of Detroit.  Detroit is an interesting case because its
region contains the fast-growing suburban Oakland County, which is capturing large
numbers of auto-related factories and headquarters that are fleeing the city of Detroit.
Yet, this same region ranked last in the Citizen’s League’s multi-dimensional index of
economic growth.  Clearly educational attainment is not the only story in economic
growth and development but it is an important part of the story.  It is also clear from Table
3 that the international economic centers and the regional economic capitals have much
deeper educated workforces than do the Rust Belt metropolitan areas.  We have no
information about cause and effect; we do not know if these places are attracting people
who have been educated elsewhere; and we do not know if these deeper pools of educated
talent are the result of homegrown human capital investments.  What is clear is that the
Cleveland CMSA has a low level of educational attainment among its resident adult
population compared to its competitors.
Greater Cleveland has indeed recovered from the economic restructuring of the
late 1970s, as evidenced by the physical rebuilding of the downtown, the renewed
competitiveness of its industrial base, and the marked improvement in the region’s
unemployment rate.  The recovery has been, and continues to be, uneven.  Poverty
increased over most of this period, as those without education that went beyond
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secondary school were left behind by an economy that increasingly does not value those
with limited skills.  The region also lags in job creation, whether or not this is due to a
skills shortage among the population—thereby leaving jobs unfilled—is not known.  The
lack of job creation is more likely due to the region’s manufacturing base, the sector
where productivity is increasing the fastest, and downtown Cleveland’s dependence on
firms in industries that are either consolidating—such as finance and advertising, or on
firms in industries that are under increasing competitive pressure as they are deregulated—
such as telecommunications and utility services.  What is troubling is the low level of
educational attainment among the adult population compared to the region’s competitors.
In the next sections of the case study the process of forming and implementing the
region’s development strategy are discussed.
Cleveland’s Culture: Once Conflict.  Now, Cooperation or Cooption?
Nothing clears the mind like an impending hanging.  [Cleveland’s] Default
was clearly the equivalent of a city’s hanging.  It got the attention of
everyone.
—William Bryant, former CEO, Greater Cleveland Growth Ass ciation
Default was the symbolic catalyst that caused the region as a whole to focus on
Cleveland’s three interrelated problems: the economic crisis confronting the region’s
industrial base, political and labor-management cultures of conflict, and a public
administrative meltdown.  Labor-management relations in this region were fundamentally
altered as a reaction to the decline in the industrial base, and as a result of institution
building in the form of Work in Northeast Ohio Council (WINOC), a labor-management
council that was formed in 1981.  In the old economy, the central issue for management
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and labor was not the competitive position of the firm and its survival; that was assured in
the essentially closed post-World War II American economy.  The central issue was the
division of economic profits between wages and salaries of workers, earnings of senior
management, and returns to stockholders.  This was adversarial.   In the old economy
management and labor were like two pigs at the trough.  They agreed that the trough
should be made as big as possible and they recruited the federal government to be the
carpenter, but they fought as hard as they could over the swill.
Conflict
Weissman (Mayor Kucinich’s chief of staff) treated everything like a labor
negotiation.  He was hard-line on everything and anything.
—Robert Jaquay
Why was a conflict-based system of industrial relations important when talking
about the region’s economic revitalization?  It is important because the industrial relations
system set the tone for the region’s political-economic culture.18  The revitalization of this
regional economy was based on equal parts of economic advantage and change in political
culture.
Dennis Kucinich was mayor of Cleveland for only two years (1977-1979), but
what time it was!  He was elected one year, barely survived a recall election the next, and
lost a general election in the third year.19  He was a self-styled urban populist who claimed
to represent the little guy and the neighborhoods against downtown corporate interests.
                                         
18This is a point Chinitz makes in his 1961 article about Pittsburgh and New York.
19The two year term of Dennis Kucinich was a formative political experience, as was the continuing battle
between the city-owned electrical company and investor-owned Cleveland Illuminating Company.  Four
essays in Keating, Krumholz, and Perry (1995) deal with these issues.   These are by: Miller and Wheeler;
Swanstrom ; Keating, Krumholz and Perry; and Bartimole.  Also see Swanstrom’s 1985 book.
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He ran on four issues: saving the municipally-owned electrical system (Muny Light),
opposition to tax abatement for downtown development, concentrating the city’s
resources on the neighborhoods, and no new taxes.  Unfortunately, Kucinich was running
a city that was financially strapped, in large part because he followed on the heels of a
mayor, Ralph Perk, who must have attended the Abe Beame school of municipal finance
and spent bond and Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) funds on the city’s
operations.20
This four-part platform put Kucinich into a political box.  He promised better
services to the neighborhoods and he had support from neighborhood-based community
development corporations.  He also promised no new taxes.  Unfortunately for him, the
city did not have the finances to deliver.  His way out was to use confrontation and turn
on the business community.21  At the same time Cleveland Electric Illuminating (CEI)
continued to actively pursue the sale of its nemesis—Muny Light.  Then the pieces need
for political gridlock fell into place.  The chair of the City’s lead underwriting bank,
Cleveland Trust Company, was on CEI’s board.  He proposed to roll over the City’s short
term bonded debt if the City sold Muny Light to CEI.  Kucinich would not do the deal.
                                                                                                                   
20Beame was the mayor of New York City who drove that city to the edge of default by spending bond
funds on municipal operating expenses.
21The involvement of corporate leadership in Cleveland’s civic life are discussed from three perspectives
in Keating, Krumholz, and Perry’s collection of essays, Cl vel nd: A Metropolitan Reader (1995).
They reprinted Myron Magnet’s laudatory 1989 Fortune magazine essay titled “How Business Bosses
Saved a Sick City.”  They also include Roldo Bartimole’s view that a visible corporate oligarchy exists
that uses public funds to redistribute income and investment opportunities in its direction in an essay titled
“Who Governs: The Corporate Hand.”  Todd Swanstrom’s essay in the same collection describes the role
of Cleveland’s banks in the city’s default and discusses both the political and economic dynamics that
triggered the default.  The three-part case study produced buy the Harvard Business School case writing
team, headed by James E. Austin, discusses the role of corporate leadership from the viewpoint of that
leadership (Austin and Strimling 1996a, 1996b and Elias and Austin 1997).
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He also could not turn to any other local bank because they stood shoulder-to-shoulder
with Cleveland Trust.  They were going to get rid of Kucinich and they did it by forcing
the city into default.  As Todd Swanstrom noted, New York City was in worse financial
shape than Cleveland and it did not default.22  To default, Cleveland required a perfect
line-up of political economic events.  First, it needed a municipal cash crisis that was
generated by the ineptness of the Perk administration, coupled with the unreal political
posturing of anti-tax populist electioneering that was unwilling to cut the expense side of
municipal government (this was voodoo municipal finance).  Second, you needed
confrontational politics that painted the potential source of a bailout as the enemy.
Kucinich did this by running against the banks.  Third, it took a business community that
was willing to take the City into default as a way to rid itself of a political irritant.  Richard
Pogue, then managing partner of the prominent law firm Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue
told Fortune magazine: “In a sense, Kucinich was the best thing that ever happened
because he became a unifying element.  People look at him and said ‘enough is enough
here.  Let’s get together and change things.’ ”23
The business community’s loathing of Kucinich was over more than just the
attempt of CEI to rid itself of a competitor and a yardstick for its rate structure—that was
the motive of CEI and its Board.  Kucinich and his chief of staff, Robert Weissman,
blocked an application to the Economic Development Administration for a new ore
unloading dock for Republic Steel (the dock was eventually built in Lorain).  There was
                                                                                                                   
22 Swanstrom (1995) and Swanstrom (1985, pp. 210-224).
23 Magnet (1995, p. 156.)
and the Accompanying Case Study
Ned Hill Page 43 February 1997
also the difficulty that firms throughout the region were having in attracting potential
workers from outside of the region, the constant conflict over downtown development,
and the realization that City Hall was a financial nightmare.24  At he same time,
Kucinich’s personality and the insular confrontational style of his staff also alienated his
supporters in the neighborhood development movement.  Reporter Fred McGunagle
concluded that “It wasn’t default or confrontations with the Establishment which defeated
Kucinich in 1979.  It was the alienation of the neighborhood people who had elected him.
George Voinovich learned from Kucinich’s mistakes, channeling block grant funds to pet
neighborhood projects.25  A confrontational style does not work for a city when it is in
decline.  Confrontational politics works when the issues are redistributional and the fight is
over pieces of the pie.  When a city, and more importantly a region, is in sharp decline you
have to bake a new pie; that takes cooperation.
Conflict was the perfect metaphor for city life in the 1960s and 1970s.  In an
interview, Richard Shatten identified nine sets of adversarial relationships that dominate
the political-economic culture of American cities: “business-neighborhood, downtown-
neighborhood, city-suburb, east-west, black-white, labor-management, rich-poor, mayor-
council, or mayor-everybody.”  Shatten said that “these define the fault lines of urban life
and that’s how decisions were made—out of conflict.  The change came for Cleveland
                                         
24 During the late 1970s major corporations and service firms, especially law and accounting firms with
national practices, had a difficult time recruiting people to work in the city.  These firms paid the Greater
Cleveland Growth Association to run a summer-long wine, dine and entertainment program targeted at
graduate school interns of these firms called Spotlight Cleveland.  The goal of the program was to change
the interns’ perceptions of the city and region.  The program lasted for seven years.  It took four or five
years before the perceptions of the recruits began to change and after seven years, as recruitment became
easier, the supporting firms found that the expense of the program was no longer justified.
25 McGunagle (1989).
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when George Voinovich rejected this framework and said that ‘together we can do it.’”
Cleveland, as a community, wasted time from 1972 to 1979 looking to Washington D.C.
to fend off foreign competitors and return to the good old days of the post-World War II
economy in much the same way that South Sea Cargo-cultists looked seaward for a tidal
wave to return the good old World War II days brought on by the American war effort.
Cleveland could not begin to revitalize until it began to look inward.
Cooperation or Cooption?
… despite who sat or sits in the mayor’s chair¾ ethnic or black¾ from 1965
to 1993, the corporate community and institutions dominated by business
interests decisively controlled the issues and dominated the public agenda…
¾Roldo Bartimole26
What replaced confrontational politics, cooperation or cooption? It’s all in the eye
of the beholder.  If you believe that a tight oligarchy sets the agenda, directs public
investments and other sources of funding, and controls the political process then you can
look at political behavior related to economic development and public real estate
investments in Cleveland as a process of systematic cooption.  If, on the other hand, you
view the political process as being structured by self-interest where groups are tied
together by a common purpose to preserve their investments, both personal (in the forms
of monetary investments in their homes and emotional investments in the quality of their
lives) and business, then the political process in revitalizing Cleveland becomes one of
broad regional consensus that was shaped by political and corporate leadership, and the
                                         
26 Bartimole (1995) page 161.
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money that is part and parcel of that leadership.  This latter formula is what lies behind
Cleveland’s revitalization¾cooperation based on self-interest.
The solution to the political and administrative crises came through a combination
of enlightened self-interest coupled with risk-taking, institution building, and deal cutting.
Confrontational city politics and labor-management relations had to end if private
investment was to take place, and City government had to function again to reduce the
perception of risk in investing the city of Cleveland..  These were the preconditions for
economic development.  First, the political deal cutting.
Three representatives of Cleveland’s business community asked Voi ovich to run
against Kucinich for mayor in 1979.  Voinovich agreed provided that his campaign was
well financed and the corporate community promised go help overhaul the city
administration—thereby addressing the administrative crisis.  Voinovich formed an
Operations Improvement Task Force immediately after his election and turned to
executives of large corporations for corporate funding and loaned executives to review all
aspects of City Hall’s operations E. Mandell deWindt and Mort Mandel told the Harvard
case writing team that five or six chief executive officers called about 30 of their peers and
raised $850,000 for the task force and recruited close to 120 loaned executives (Austin
and Strimling 1996a, pp.4-5).  Voinovich’s election brought forward a new style of
collaborative politics and greater involvement of suburban corporate leaders in the city’s
political affairs.
Two structural changes in city government were also made that lowered the
political fires substantially.  The election cycle for mayor and council was stretched out
from two years to four years and the council was reduced in size.  These two actions kept
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the council and mayor from being in constant “campaign mode” and the positioning for
press attention was diminished decreasing the number of council positions.  Several
observers of politics at that time said that these actions improved the climate for
governing.
Understanding was also fostered by the creation of two process-oriented
organizations, the Greater Cleveland Roundtable and WINOC.  The Roundtable grew out
of attempts in the late 1970s of the region’s African American leadership to build bridges
to the corporate leadership (Austin and  Strimling, 1996a, pp.17-18).  After much
preparatory discussions that were facilitated by the Cleveland Foundation a retreat was
held for a broad cross-section of the community’s leadership ethnic, political, and
corporate leadership to form some sort of bridge-building organization.  The facilitator of
the group found that the leadership of the African American community had two views as
to the purpose of such an organization.  One would be a forum for articulating the
aspirations and concerns of the black community, but this type of organization would
compete with the local branch of the NAACP and the Urban League and it would be
purely process oriented.  The alternative was to form an organization that had a broad
mission of identifying the “problems of the day” and work towards their solution.  In other
words a process organization that worked its process through identified tasks and
projects.  The Roundtable identified housing and neighborhood development as areas that
needed community-wide attention.  The Roundtable was important as a vehicle for this
broad group of leaders to know each other, and it involved corporate leaders as a group in
the city’s and region’s racial politics.
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African Americans were also brought into the new political calculus through the
President of Cleveland City Council, George Forbes, who reached an early
accommodation with the new Mayor.  Forbes soon became part of a two person
governmental team (Mayor and Council President) that emphasized development and
could carryout the development agenda.  The combination of the partnership between the
Mayor and Council President and the work of the Roundtable eased racial politics in
Cleveland for over a decade.
WINOC was the second process institution that created a climate for changing
labor-management relations and changing the second arena of confrontational politics to
collaborative politics.  WINOC was founded in 1981 and maintained a relatively low
profile but soon developed a series of programs to improve product quality and
productivity in the workplace.  The organization worked because union leadership took
the risk of working indirectly with management to improve productivity.  They did it
because they saw the results of conflict—the shops either closed or moved.
Both WINOC and the Roundtable were process organizations that broke down
barriers through personal interaction and the involvement of leaders, but they did it by
identifying tasks and developing tangible products.  This the an organizational style that
was employed by all of the intermediary organizations that followed.  But the projects are
only part of the success of these organizations.  They provided a setting for different parts
of the community’s leadership to get to know each other, understand their problems and
motivations, and allowed them to pick up telephones and form fluid coalitions around
different projects.  Cleveland Tomorrow, which was founded in 1982, offered a similar
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opportunity for the leadership of the 50 largest private employers to break down barriers
that also existed in the corporate community.
A Fortunate Political Confluence
We were so successful [at getting UDAGs] that they killed the program.
¾Richard Shatten
Janis Purdy emphasized the importance of civic infrastructure to a region that
needs to revitalize.  She said that “having federal programs in place doesn’t mean that a
city will use, or can, use them if they do not have the capacity.”  Purdy claimed that
Cleveland could not make extensive use federal programs during the 1970s because the
capacity did not exist to go after the funds and to spend them responsibly.  However,
Cleveland’s improved access to federal funds during the 1980s was for reasons that went
beyond staff competence.  A unique confluence of political events gave the city access to
these funds.  Once it began spending them the City achieved a reputation of competence,
which kept the funds flowing.
David Sweet noted that in 1979 and 1980 Cleveland had a unique advantage
compared to other cities.  It was one of a few that easily meet federal distress criteria and
had a Republican mayor at a time when a new Republican Administration was coming into
office.  Northeast Ohio also had a senior delegation in the House of Representatives that
worked in bi-partisan fashion in pursuit of a regional agenda.  The dean of the delegation
was Democratic Congressman Louis Stokes, who was a ranking member of the House
Appropriations subcommittee that passed on the Department of Housing and Urban
Development’s budget.  Democratic Congresswoman Mary Rose Oakar was a member of
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the senior leadership of the House and played a central role in supporting the city’s UDAG
applications, in addition to supporting other Cleveland projects.  A Republican member,
Ralph Regula, worked with the Northeast Ohio delegation on obtaining a National Park
for the region and is very supportive of the Cleveland Advanced Manufacturing Program
(CAMP).  This political lineup was supported by the ability of the city and region, through
the Voinovich Administration’s and Growth Association’s lobbying efforts, to present a
unified, long term, list of capital projects that that could be supported by both the
Congressional delegation and Regan Administration.  Another player was the leader of the
Teamsters Union, Jackie Presser, who reportedly turned his union’s support for Regan
into the Administration’s support for assigning work for the space platform to NASA
Lewis Research Center.
Where was federal support the most important?  Clearly the flow of UDAGs was
critical to the city and the increase in CDBG funds during the Perk Administration was
crucial to the City’s finances.  But before the UDAGs, came Cleveland’s designation as a
demonstration city in the area of infrastructure.  Here the Growth Association’s work in
establishing Build Up Greater Cleveland was critical.  The Association took on a program
developed by the Urban Institute and became a demonstration site for the infrastructure
program.  This action triggered $2 billion in federal funds and laid the foundation for a
state-wide bond issue for further infrastructure investment.27  What is common to both the
infrastructure funds and the UDAGs is that politics opened the door for the region, but the
projects were done and Cleveland earned a national reputation as being a place where
things can be completed.  The city’s record keeps the funds flowing, and the vehicle for
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managing the projects is typically a public-private partnership.  William Bryant said that
Greater Cleveland formed 37 separate public-private partnerships to implement its
development strategy.
At the same time period the power of Northeast Ohio’s delegation in the state
capitol also increased.  Newly elected Governor Richard Celeste was a policy innovator
interested in economic development.  He started the technology investment programs—
the Edison Partnerships¾that started and supported CAMP.  At the same time the second
ranking Democrat in the House was Patrick Sweeney, who worked with the delegation to
discipline the region’s priorities in the state’s capitol budget.  The combination with
improved political visibility both in Washington and Columbus provided access to funds to
implement the region’s development strategy.  However, these tools could not have been
used if solutions to the region’s political and administrative crises were not found.
The foundation of Cleveland’s economic restructuring was political and it was the
three-way partnership that was formed between George Voinovich, George Forbes, and
the corporate leadership of the region.  The center of the revival was Voinovich and his
collaborative style.  Voinovich was, however, the right person at the right time.  The City
of Cleveland’s electorate and the people of the region were tired of confrontational,
populist politics and wanted to try something new.  Also the balance of power in the
region had shifted from the City to the County because the County had deeper
resources—this gave added incentive to find solutions and policies in which county voters
                                                                                                                   
27 See O’Brien et al (1995).
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could invest.  Cleveland Tomorrow could not have succeeded without this new political
center.
The Evolution of a Development Strategy
While we Clevelanders congratulate ourselves on pulling our city and region
back from the depths of economic decline and its resulting community decay,
let us acknowledge that our work has only begun. ... [W]e have stabilized our
manufacturing employment base, but it’s a fragile stability.  Serious troubles
among any of our major manufacturers could deeply damage Cleveland’s
economy. ... Cleveland is not yet a major financial center, nor is our service
sector sufficient to drive the economy.  By many measures, Cleveland is still
stressed.
—Joseph Gorman, Chief Executive Officer, TRW28
Soon after Voinovich’s election eight of the city’s business leaders formed the Cleveland
Tomorrow Project Committee to put together a strategy that would address the city’s
economic problems—which soon became evident were really regional.29  They received a
grant from the Gund Foundation and hired the local office of McKinsey & Company to
study the local economy, examine best-practice development programs in other
metropolitan regions, and make recommendations for a development strategy for
Cleveland.  The resulting report was issued a year latter and stressed the loss of market
share of the region’s core industries and the lack of firms in new, fast growing industries.
The eight leaders decided to establish Cleveland Tomorrow as an intermediary
organization composed of the chief executive officers of the largest private employers in
the region, the staff and operating budget of Cleveland Tomorrow would be supported by
                                         
28Cleveland Tomorrow, 1993, p.4.
29 See Shatten (1995) and Austin and Strimling (1996a).
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corporate dues, and the organization that would be charged with implementing the
strategy.  Cleveland Tomorrow then hired two of the people McKinsey placed on the
study project as staff.  This was the point when the development strategy was formed and
placed into the stewardship of Cleveland Tomorrow, who maintained strategic focus, and
the Cleveland and Gund Foundations, who provided seed money for specific projects and
intermediary institutions that spun out of Cleveland Tomorrow.
What has proven more durable then the initial strategy is the civic infrastructure
that was formed, the improved professional capacity of local government and growth in
non-profit organizations that evolved to implement the strategy and the way in which the
strategy was formulated.  This period proved to be critical to the region’s transition and it
is where the central lessons about Cleveland-style revitalization can be learned.
The time period from 1983 through the City’s current administration of Mayor
Michael L. White has witnessed the execution of that strategy.  Some observers think that
the years 1994 to 1996 marked the beginning of a fourth period in the region’s
revitalization.  There was a change-over in the leadership of both the Growth Association
and Cleveland Tomorrow.  The City’s drive to encourage new housing construction in the
neighborhoods began to bear fruit, thanks in no small part to the loan pools that Mayor
White extracted from the region’s major banks under the Community Reinvestment Act
(CRA).  This time period also saw the completion of many of the original downtown
construction projects and the politics of constructing three sports stadiums dominated the
downtown development scene, they consumed not only a large amount of money—three
quarters of a billion dollars—but an incredible amount of time and energy on the part of
the Mayor, corporate community, and development organizations.  Two other facts mark
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the beginning of a new era in Cleveland’s development.  First, many of the intermediary
organizations that were targeted in the original development plans were up and running.
Second, three social issues loomed as the next major development targets: functioning of
the city of Cleveland’s public schools, workforce development, and suburban sprawl.
The Original Strategy
Cleveland’s experience indicates that local economic development consists of
opportunistic actions taken within a strategic framework.  This appears to be the case in
other large cities as well.  Robert Mier, reflecting on his time as Chicago’s development
director, said: “The question (of economic development) is how does an agenda and
operating ad hoc go hand in hand.”30
There is no one place to find the development goals and strategies that evolved
from 1979 to 1983.  No one organization has ownership over the strategy, because it
represents a broad consensus among various levels of government, numerous private and
non-profit institutions, and is widely accepted by residents of the region.  Having said that,
it is also clear that this consensus was forged under the leadership of a relatively small
group of business and political honchos, with the support of the two dominant local
foundations, the Cleveland and Gund Foundations.  The clearest expression of the initial
strategy, and its evolution, is documented in a report linked to the founding of Cleveland
                                         
30 Quoted in Norman Krumholz and Pierre Clavel, Rein enting Cities: Equity Planners Tell Their
Stories (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994) p.79 and in Robert Giloth and Wim Wiewel
“Equity Development in Chicago: Robert Mier’s Ideas and Practice, Economic Development Quarterly
(1996).
and the Accompanying Case Study
Ned Hill Page 54 February 1997
Tomorrow, by McKinsey & Co.31  The evolution in strategy can be traced with two other
reports from Cleveland Tomorrow, one issued in January, 1988, the other in January,
1993.32
The stated mission of Cleveland Tomorrow in 1988 was to “help Greater
Cleveland become known as the pre-eminent business and professional center between
New York and Chicago.”33  The 1983 mission statement of the newly organized Economic
Development Department of the City of Cleveland was “to provide leadership to capitalize
on Cleveland’s strengths to build a stronger City and regional economy.”34  These two
statements encapsulate the region’s development goals.  There are three, and they have
remained constant since the early 1980s.  The first is to provide an economic rationale for
Cleveland’s downtown, or central business district (CBD).  The second is to stabilize, and
then grow, the employment base of the r gion.  The third is to help stabilize the middle-
class base of the City of Cleveland’s neighborhoods.  In the mid-1990s this last goal is
beginning to expand to include the inner-ring suburbs that are experiencing growing
poverty populations and racial change.  (What is ironic is that these suburbs, Cleveland
Heights, Lakewood, and Shaker Heights, traditionally housed the region’s elite
                                         
31McKinsey & Co. (1981), a second study completed by Rand Corporation (1982) strongly suggested that
the region develop policy research capacity, which led to the foundation of Regional Economic Issues
which eventually became part of the Weatherhead School of Business at Case Western Reserve University.
32Cleveland Tomorrow is an organization of the chief executive officers of the 50 largest employers in the
Cleveland region.
33Cleveland Tomorrow, 1988, p.25.
34 City of Cleveland, Department of Economic Development, “Economic Development  Strategy 1983-
1984 (mimeo).
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population.)35  The strategy clearly envisions the CBD as one of several prominent centers
of employment in the Greater Cleveland region, and it links the future of the region to the
viability of the CBD and, secondarily, to that of the City of Cleveland’s neighborhoods.
Richard Shatten, former director of Cleveland Tomorrow, wrote that the
organization initially focused on five issues that framed Cleveland Tomorrow’s agenda:
(1) Cleveland had lost its competitive position in the world economy, (2) manufacturing
was declining faster regionally than it was nationally, (3) corporations were not replacing
lost manufacturing jobs with new companies, (4) labor-management relations needed to be
improved, and (5) new companies needed to be formed from a research base that existed
in the region’s universities, hospitals, and federal laboratories.  Recognition of these five
challenges grew out of the 1981 McKinsey report.  Cleveland Tomorrow added the
physical development of downtown to its agenda after the 1982 Rand Corporation report
and at the suggestion of Cleveland Tomorrow’s Officer’s Group.36  A conversation
between Mayor Voinovich and William Marriott, chairman and CEO of Marriott
Corporation, also helped to put downtown Cleveland on the development agenda.  Early
into his administration Voinovich was reported to have asked Marriott when he was going
to put a hotel in Cleveland.  Marriott told him that the downtown was in such poor shape
that Cleveland was not even on his corporation’s list of possible development targets.
This focused the mayor’s attention.  The original five points of the  agenda all related to
                                         
35 See DeWitt (1995).  These three suburbs have always had a wide range of housing stock.  The upper
end of the stock in all three cases are feeling competitive threat from much more homogenous exclusive
outer-ring suburbs.  Of greater concern is that the middle portion of their stock is under extreme pressure
from suburbs where new units sell from $100,000 to $175,000.
36 Shatten (1995) p. 326 and Austin and Strimling (1996a) pp. 6-8.
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improving the regional economy, the sixth is the foundation for the physical
redevelopment of the downtown.
A Shared Agenda?
Was this just Cleveland Tomorrow’s agenda; or, was the list widely shared in
Greater Cleveland in the early 1980s?  Cleveland Tomorrow’s agenda is best known
because it was written down and was widely articulated, but the organization was just one
of two focal points in the region’s early attempts to organize for development.  The
dominant center was held by Mayor George Voinovich and his administration.37  There
were other important players and each had control over an important set of resources.
· The Greater Cleveland Growth Association shared much of Cleveland Tomorrow’s
agenda and provided funding support for lobbying and housed many of the new
organizations that were developed to implement the agenda.
· The city of Cleveland was well positioned due to its electing a big-city Republican
mayor during the Regan Administration’s oversight of the UDAG program.  HUD
Secretary Pierce and the White House had so politicized the program that Cleveland
became a favored grantee.
· The Cleveland Foundation and George Gund Foundation provided start-up funds for
many of the intermediary organizations that were created and injected seed capitol into
the Playhouse Square Development and many of the neighborhood housing initiatives.
                                         
37 Roldo Bartimole, among others, would argue that the Mayor represented the same set of downtown-
corporate interests that were represented by Cleveland Tomorrow (See: Bartimole 1995; Swanstrom 1985,
especially his last chapter).
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· The County Commissioners were important for their financial support of physical
development projects and their absorption of some of the City’s financial
responsibilities.
· Governor Richard Celeste’s vision of an activist state government in the area of
economic development and his willingness to increase the share of the state’s capital
budget devoted to projects in Cleveland were sources of finance for the region’s
recovery.
· The two legislative delegations, state and federal, worked to find funds at critical
junctures.  The leadership in the federal delegation came from Congresspersons Stokes
and Oakar.  The leadership in the state house came from State Representative Patrick
Sweeney.  Congressperson Stokes was second ranking majority member of the House
subcommittee that controlled the budgets of the U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Affairs and Congressperson Oakar sat on the Appropriations Committee and
played a critical role in both securing UDAG funding for the downtown development
projects and was a major force in preserving the NSAS-Lewis research facility.
Representative Sweeney worked with the Governor to put Cleveland and Northeast
Ohio’s priorities in the state’s semi-annual capitol budget.  What made the work of the
legislative delegations possible was that the community, through the City
Administration, the Growth Association, and Cleveland Tomorrow, presented a stable
set of, largely physical, development projects over a decade-long time period.
· Finally, there were project advocates¾people who owned a piece of property, people
who could profit from a specific deal, and people who were advocates for a specific
physical development project.
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Three projects¾Sohio’s Headquarters, Tower City and Playhouse Square¾were
the bellwether physical investments in downtown Cleveland.  Sohio was important
because it was a symbol that the corporate community was not going to abandon the city’s
core.  The other two projects were important because they became models for
development activities that followed¾they were the early projects that trained the civic
development infrastructure.  They were the projects that entailed the most political and
economic risk.  They were the first of a string of complex projects that where structured
and provided the models for those that followed.  Tower City was the model for an
essentially private investment that relied heavily on federal government sources for finance
(these were UDAG grants).  Playhouse Square was the prototype of a highly leveraged
civic project that became possible with corporate and foundation leadership and risk
capital, that was augment by substantial capital investments by state and county
governments.
Sohio’s headquarters building, latter British Petroleum’s (BP), came before the
other two projects, and it was viewed as an important sign of faith in the city’s core but it
was not typical of the projects that followed.  Sohio was a private deal, done at the
insistence of the company’s CEO Alton Whitehouse, and it was nearly the last major
development project that did not involve some form of public participation.38  Sohio was
                                         
38 John Ferchill’s North Point Tower followed and did not receive direct public support.  Ferchill spoke at
a local meeting of the Urban Land Institute to discuss his development strategy.  He said that he wanted to
sign up his tenants before the publicly supported towers came online.  He anticipated that a glut of office
space would develop when Tower City, Society Tower, and the expected Ameritrust Tower¾that was
never built¾opened.  He thought that the glut would hold down rents and take down developers.  He
stated that waiting for public tax abatements or UDAGs would cost his project too much money due to the
time delays incurred.  Ferchill’s predictions of the impact of the big projects on the local market proved to
be correct.  Unfortunately, the second phase of his North Point project was not completed in time to win
this race.
and the Accompanying Case Study
Ned Hill Page 59 February 1997
originally granted abatement for another site in Public Square where they did not build.
Before they concluded the deal for the new site Cleveland voters reacted negatively to the
tax abatement for the National City Bank Building and the Kucinich Administration would
not support further abatement for downtown projects.  Whitehouse proceeded with the
project without the abatements.  This was possible because the funding was secured by the
developer, who was Sohio, and the investment was being made more for corporate
symbolic reasons than as a real estate investment.  When Sohio was fully absorbed by BP
the building was sold and the company put through a vigorous downsizing.  The
importance of Sohio’s building was symbolic.  It was built after TRW left the city for the
eastern suburbs and it was a visible statement that downtown Cleveland was a viable
business address.  The building also set a design standard that Planning Director Hunter
Morrison was able used to guide downtown development over the ensuing decade.
Albert Ratner, of Forest City Development is made the Tower City project
possible.  One person I interviewed told me that Tower City happened because Ratner did
not fall asleep on an airplane.  Ratner was flying somewhere over the Colorado Rockies
and thought to himself “Why do I have to leave town to do deals?  Why not try a major
project in Cleveland?”  This was the start of the Tower City Center project.  Forest City
Development had the experience to complete complicated real estate transactions and they
knew how the UDAG program worked.  This is the project that is acknowledged as
having taught the City’s Economic Development Department how to put together the
complex financing of urban real estate development projects and how to use Urban
Development Action Grants (UDAGs).  Additionally, the City hired Dayton’s
development director, Gary Connally, who had experience with these types of projects to
and the Accompanying Case Study
Ned Hill Page 60 February 1997
head the office.  If the Sohio Building was a vote of confidence in Public Square by the
business community, then Tower City Center was a statement that Public Square remained
the symbolic heart of the city and it became the symbol of Cleveland’s rebirth.
Three civic activists became the saviors of Playhouse Square, first rallying
corporate support through Cleveland Tomorrow and then enlisting “risk capital” from the
Cleveland Foundation.  Playhouse Square became the model that was followed in a
number of early development projects.  Building preservationists worked hard to generate
public support for a number of theaters grouped at the eastern edge of downtown.  They
put together a case that the theaters were a traffic generator that would both create a
market for development and secure a vital piece of the city and keep the land from being
turned into parking lots.  Cleveland Tomorrow and the Cleveland Foundation supported
the creation of a non-profit intermediary who are charged with the development of the
Playhouse Square “neighborhood.”  There was direct corporate and foundation
involvement in the early stages of the project and they secured funding form Cuyahoga
County to make the project happen.
The civic projects¾Playhouse Square, Gateway and the Northcoast Harbor, along
with Tower City¾ are the cornerstone for the visitor destination development strategy for
downtown.  More importantly, however, they also have three important symbolic values.
First, and foremost, they offer a tangible symbol of the revitalization of the city and region.
Second, they are proof that the coalition of business, government and activists can
complete physical development projects.  Finally, they offer an opportunity for Cleveland’s
City Planning Commission to subtly shape the fabric of the built environment of the
downtown.
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The Galleria was completed before Tower City, but it used UDAG’s and tax
abatement in ways that were pioneered for the Tower City project.  Gateway¾the
location of Jacob’s Field and Gund Arena, and Northcoast Harbor¾home of the Rock
Hall and Science Museum¾were financed by a combination of funds from the County and
the state capitol budget, techniques that were pioneered for Play House Square.
An overarching agenda hatched by a small cabal of downtown development
interests did not, and does not, exit.  Although Robert Jaquay noted that there were “a
handful of agendas” based on the self-interest of each participant.  In other words, the six
or so goals for Cleveland’s revival were the common denominator that tied a number of
powerful interests together.  These agendas came together on projects that could be
accomplished with the resources either in hand, or in the immediate offing.  That is where
the federal government entered the picture.
The Formula for Cleveland-style Economic Development
Cleveland-style revitalization is almost a formula and when a project falls outside
of that formula it fails.  First, the most successful projects are bricks and mortar projects
because development coalitions work best when there is a tangible project that is
“doable.”  What makes a project “doable” is that a source for the base-line funding, which
serves as the investment capital or very patient debt, is identifiable.  The project also must
fit into the broad development strategy that has evolved over time so that it can become
part of Cleveland’s “development story.”  The second part of the formula is that there
must be a stakeholder who can build a coalition that includes the primary investor (which
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is often a unit of government), the corporate community (which can provide seed capital
from the community foundations, Cleveland Tomorrow, and corporate grants), and City
and County government.  The third part of the formula is that the project must be adopted
by the civic infrastructure who can staff the project.  If the project is privately owned, then
the project is managed by the developer but receives support form the civic infrastructure.
If it is a civic project then it will be managed by some from of a not-for-profit
organization.  What is critical to Cleveland-style development is that there is the
knowledge-base in the community to staff and complete complicated projects and that all
of the players¾the corporate community, developers, banks, not-for-profits
organizations, State, County, and City governments as well as the legislative
delegations¾knew how the process worked.  Finally, the project had to have some broad
appeal in the County.  Regional appeal is required for several reasons: County government
is often a critical funder and the County Commissioners need to sell the investments to
suburban residents, corporate leadership¾and often their employees¾ rarely live in the
city and the projects have to make sense to their lives, and Cleveland’s downtown is a
regional resource that is dependent on suburban labor for its economic vitality.39
Critical to the process is that all of the players ascribe to the original Voinovich
dictum: “together we can do it.”  What is different about Cleveland-style development is
that it is largely self-effacing and credit-claiming does not appear to be important to those
who put together the projects and managed the process.  Instead, projects fall apart when
there is blatant attempts at grand-standing, or credit-claiming, or when project advocates
                                         
39 See Bingham and Kalich (1996).
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fail to take the time to put together coalitions that included a fairly broad array of elected
officials and the corporate community.  What is ironic is that the more Voinovich rejected
credit-claiming, the more credit he received.
There have been development projects that have failed during the 1980s and early
1990s and it is these projects that prove the model.  The Regional Transit Authority
proposed a rail transit project that would connect the University Circle area to downtown
along Euclid Avenue.  The project could not garner sufficient public support, and enough
federal funds, and the County Commissioners were skeptical about the project.  Cleveland
Tomorrow staffed an attempt to build a new baseball park in 1987 and 1988 without a
public partner and the effort failed.  Richard Shatten wrote that “this was a public project
that required private sector support¾not the other way around.”40  The same can be said
for the attempts to build a new home for the Cleveland Browns football team in 1994 and
1995.  The stadium is being built only after Mayor White led a public campaign, targeting
largely suburban voters, to extend the “sin taxes” used to pay for the Gateway complex.
The NFL stadium is a “gorilla” project that cannot be justified on economic development
grounds, it has taken funds from other projects in the state’s capitol budget, but will go
forward due to the popularity of professional football in Northeast Ohio.
There were two projects proposed for the waterfront at the same time that serve as
a good test of the Cleveland development model.  One, The Great Lakes Science Center,
was built using the model, the other, the Aquarium, was viewed as a purely public project
and was never built (it was a victim of Gateway’s cost overruns and the NFL stadium).
                                         
40 Shatten (1995) page 329.
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Because a broad-based development coalition was never put together, and corporate
support of three professional sports venues does not leave much money for much else, the
Aquarium will most likely never be built.
Current Strategy
Strategies to reach the region’s development goals have changed over time.  The
most striking change is in the strategy for reaching the first goal—providing an
economically viable rationale for downtown Cleveland.  The initial strategy was to focus
on corporate headquarters, retailing, and financial services employment as the anchor.
This has shifted to preserving existing office employment, pursuing other office
employment opportunistically, while developing a destination tourist industry to
complement the CBD’s function as a regional entertainment district and tourism
attraction.41  The shift in strategy was made necessary by blossoming vacancy rates in
downtown office buildings in the early 1990s.  The rates, coupled tendency of
headquarters that were new to the region¾such as OfficeMax, Progressive Insurance, and
MBNA¾to locate along the I-271 in the eastern suburbs, indicate that downtown could
not primarily rely on a Fortune 1000 headquarters strategy as its economic rationale.
In an interview, Richard Shatten said that the strategy for reviving Cleveland’s
economy in 1995 has four parts: promote downtown Cleveland as a visitor destination;
reestablish market conditions in persistently poor neighborhoods (particularly for the
housing market); create jobs in new industries through entrepreneurship and scientific
                                         
41 Deloitte & Touche (1994), Iannone (1994), and Regional Economic Issues (1992).
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research; and restore competitive leadership to the manufacturing sector, which is the
historical economic base of the region.  Shatten also said that having a competitively
educated workforce is an emerging concern of the membership of Cleveland Tomorrow.
Workforce development is an issue that is moving onto the broader community agenda,
due to its adoption as a priority of the new leader of the Growth Association,  Carole
Hoover.
Cleveland has a number of regional organizations that act as development
intermediaries and they have a well articulated set of objectives.  Three facts are striking
about these organizations.  First, the majority did not exist before 1980.  The restructuring
of Greater Cleveland’s economy was accompanied by an explosion in the number of
economic development intermediaries.  Secondly, their objectives largely derive from the
original set identified in the early 1980s.42  Third, when specific industries are targeted
they reflect the original development strategy.  These targeted industries emphasize the
region’s industrial specialization and reflect the desire to grow new firms from the
research and technological base that exists in the region.
                                         
42The Growth Association’s eight critical outcomes for the region in 1995 are typical: (1) revitalize the
manufacturing base, (2) increase business formation, (3) increases high-wage, high-growth services and
technology sectors, (4) create a more efficient labor market, (5) restore economic vitality in the city of
Cleveland, (6) increase female and minority participation in the economy, (7) increase export activity and
improve air connections, and (8) develop the visitor destination industry.  The Growth Association
continues to support efforts at selling the image of the region nationally, it supports efforts at lobbying for
physical development within the region (paying special attention to Cleveland’s downtown), and it is one
of a number of organizations that pursues the traditional economic development function of firm
attraction and retention.  Cleveland Tomorrow (1996, p.1) endorsed a slightly different list in 1996.  They
endorsed “education, downtown and  neighborhood development, and technology as the core areas for
concentration through the balance of the decade.”
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The Civic Infrastructure
Development did not take place solely due to money from the federal
government.  Of equal, or greater, value was the civic infrastructure.  The
partnership between the Mayor (first Voinovich and then White) and the
private sector through Cleveland Tomorrow, the Growth Association, NPI
(Neighborhood Progress Incorporated), etc.
¾Janis Purdy, The Citizens League.
What was behind the development of a sophisticated civic infrastructure and the
self-effacing nature of development politics?  There are three parts to the answer.  One lies
in 1979.  In that year the League of Women Voters passed petitions to get an extension of
the mayoral and council terms from two years to four years and reduced the size of
council.  This action, in and of itself, reduced the necessity for credit-claiming on the part
of elected officials, taking some of the political edge off of publicly supported projects.
The second was the administrative crisis faced by the City of Cleveland; the City did not
have the staff capacity or staffing flexibility to execute these complex problems.  Finally,
the neighborhood-based community development movement provided a ready model of
how to use production oriented intermediaries to staff and organize projects that often
evolved into public-private partnerships.  An extensive network of community based
organizations (CBOs) and community development corporations where founded and
supported in the city of Cleveland during the 1970s.  These organizations were originally
supported by the Catholic Church and local foundations.  The Voinovich Administration
and Council increased their support by providing the CBOs with access to Community
Development Block Grants.
These CBOs were a model for three separate networks of not-for-profit
development intermediaries: neighborhood based housing development specialists,
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spatially based representatives of employers, and regional economic development
organizations.  The neighborhood based CBOs were strongly encourage by the two local
foundations to concentrate on housing production, they were given funds to
professionalize their staffs, and the foundations created Neighborhood Progress
Incorporated to act as a clearing house for proposals to the foundations and to focus
investments so that development could “build to scale.”  This specialization paid-off when
the White Administration aggressively used provisions of the Community Reinvestment
Act (CRA) to file protests against bank mergers as a way of creating a  large CRA
supported loan pool.  This pool has been used by CBOs to finance both mortgages on
used housing and new housing construction aimed at attracting middle class residents back
into the city.
The second set of CBOs are organizations such as Midtown Corridor, Inc.,
Lakeside Area Development Corporation (LADCO), Southeast Development
Corporation, and Westside Industrial Retention and Expansion Network (WIRENET).
These organizations represent their members, mostly small and mid-sized industrial firms,
before city government, act as intermediaries between neighborhood residents and the
employers¾most provide some form of job matching service, and a few engage in
physical development activities.  These not-for-profit organizations became the models for
a group of economic development organizations that operate regionally.
The largest regional development organization is the Cleveland Advanced
Manufacturing Program (CAMP), that provides technical assistance to manufacturers
from Youngstown to Toledo.  Akron is home to a second such organization, the Edison
Polymer Program.  Both were founded with seed money from the State of Ohio’s Edison
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Technology Program.  They completed their funding from memberships and federal
funding.  The Cleveland-based Ohio Aerospace Institute is acting in a similar fashion to
CAMP but is specialized in using the capabilities of the technology base of NASA Lewis
as a development tool.  Most of these organizations can trace their roots to Cleveland
Tomorrow, as can Primus Capital Fund (a venture capital firm) and Enterprise
Development Incorporated (EDI), an industrial incubator facility with loose links to Case
Western Reserve University.  In much the same way that Neighborhood Progress Inc. is
the umbrella for the neighborhood based housing developers, Cleveland Tomorrow is the
umbrella of the region-wide economic development not-for-profit agencies.  Where they
differ, however, is that the economic development organizations are more independent of
Cleveland Tomorrow partly due to Cleveland Tomorrow’s desire to spin off activities and
partly due to the diversity of funding streams that these organizations have developed over
time.
There is something new and important that is evolving from the civic
infrastructure.  The infrastructure is providing leadership and stability that once came from
corporate leaders.  Richard Shatten mentioned the increasing difficulty in keeping
Cleveland Tomorrow focused at the end of his tenure as Executive Director due to the
instability in its membership¾t e firms stayed the same but turnover in chief executives
had accelerated in the 1990s (William Bryant stated that the average tenure has dropped
to four and a half years).
Robert Jaquay noted that sprawl is fanning a new leadership crisis: firms and
industries are increasingly locating on highway beltways on the outskirts of the
metropolitan areas and their executives often live even further out in the country.  They
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are cut off in a real way from the city, with the exception of the airport and entertainment
facilities, and are not connected to city-specific issues.  If they are active in civic issues it is
in state-wide and regional subjects.  Several observers mentioned that there is also a
generational change underway in the region’s corporate leadership.  Those who were
deeply involved Cleveland’s civic life in the late 1970s and the 1980s are retiring from
civic life and it is not clear who the new leaders are and the base of corporations has
narrowed.  Keycorp has clearly replaced Ameritrust and BP as the leading downtown
employer and it has increased its visibility (but this is one firm playing a role that was once
shared by three actors).  Several other of the city of Cleveland’s large employers are
themselves not-for-profit entities and are limited in the investments they can make, this is
true of the hospitals and universities¾to b  perfectly crass, they are all on the taking end
of the wallet and not on the giving end.
Christopher Johnson, director of Midtown Corridor, stated that the Cleveland
Foundation brought stability to the corporate leadership by supporting the executives of
the non-profit intermediaries.  Johnson noted that the executives of the non-profits stay at
their positions longer than the new generation of CEOs do and the leaders of the not-for-
profit organizations provide continuity to the regional development agenda by acting as
the institutional knowledge base.  They also have legitimacy in the eyes of the new
corporate CEOs who use the non-profit leaders to educated themselves about their
expected role.  There is an additional benefit to this civic infrastructure.  It grew up during
the 1980s and most of the not-for-profit leaders know each other well and they work well
together.  They provide the solid face that exists across organizations when there is an
opportunity for external funding.  In this sense the civic infrastructure is in danger of
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becoming self-perpetuating.  What is missing from this tableau is the mediating institution.
Who maintains the culture?  Who disciplines the leaders of the not-for profits when the
interests of their organization begins to collide with the interest of the established civic
strategic agenda?  The only candidate organization is their common funding agencies, the
two community foundations.
There is a specific flavor to Cleveland-style development.  All interviewed clearly
stated that the leadership for the development activity in Cleveland in the 1980s came
from the private sector.  William Bryant indicated that the downtown corporate leadership
recruited George Voinovich to run for mayor and underwrote his campaign.  David
Sweet, Dean of the College of Urban Affairs, best summarized  the limits of Cleveland’s
revitalization:
Cleveland’s credibility was wrapped around specific bricks and mortar
projects; and it needed to be project specific.  The private sector understands
bricks and mortar.  It is harder to understand and address the root causes of
Cleveland’s problems, such as race relations and poverty.  This is not a knock
on the corporate leadership; it is a reality…. The community got rolling
around these projects [referring to the UDAG supported projects] and George
Voinovich was the fulcrum around which these developments revolved…
Despite the organizational efforts of a city, or of a region, the best it can do is to work
around the edges of larger economic and social forces.  In many ways what makes
Cleveland interesting is that it is representative of a large number of older metropolitan
areas in the United States.  As such, its fate is largely determined by a combination of its
history, investments, and national policies.  Cleveland’s major problems cannot be called a
crisis.  It has two sets of problems.  One are the forces that cause sprawl and the federal
policies that promote sprawl.  In a market economy, moves and decisions that are made by
people and firms that are in their best interest are applauded, as long as they bear the full
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costs incurred by their actions.  In modern metropolitan America the forces that promote
sprawl are subsidized by federal tax policies.  These are the real federal forces that shape
Cleveland’s future.  The second set of problems is housing segregation and concentrated
poverty.
The Federal Role in Cleveland’s Revitalization
The federal government was catalytic in terms of providing money to jump
start a stagnant economy [referring to downtown].  Due to the  [local]
politics of that time people would not take the development risks.
¾Janis Purdy
Context
Federal urban policy is a molecule in an ocean of federal policies that hurt
cities.
—Richard Shatten
There are three interventions by the Federal Government that encourage excessive
development in stagnant economies: federally subsidized infrastructure investments
(especially highway construction), the mortgage interest deduction from personal income
taxes, and the capital gains treatment of housing.  These Federal actions are aided by state
highway, infrastructure, and other public capital funds and a lack of effective metropolitan
decision making structures.  The result is a land market that encourages new construction
on the edges of the metropolitan area and discourages housing investments in older areas.
Mid-Town Corridor’s Christopher Johnson summed up the dilemma best when he said
that “we aren’t growing as fast as we are developing.”
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Robert Jaquay looked at the total effect of Federal and State capital spending,
especially highway funds, on the Cleveland region and noted that “a priority of our
investment pattern has been to finance internal commuter trips, not to deal with, or
connect to, the rest of the world.  We are spending money to facilitate sprawl.”  This
spending, and the sprawl that it accommodates, is a powerful result of federal policies.
But as Jaquay and others recognize, the federal government played an important role in
the revitalization of downtown Cleveland, and the federal government was an important
investor in the region’s economic development intermediary organizations.
Federal Expenditures
Year-in and year-out the federal government pumps from $4 billion to $5 billion
(in 1983 constant dollars) into the Cuyahoga County, the county that contains Cleveland.
(Table 4)  We assigned every federal grant and contract that flowed directly into the
county from 1983 to 1993 into one of twelve categories and aggregated those categories
into five expenditure classes.43  The reason why these figures are minimums is that federal
money that enters the region through the state budget cannot be identified.  This federal
undercount is especially severe in the area of infrastructure spending, where a large
fraction of what Ohio’s Department of Transportation spends comes from the federal
Highway Trust Fund and other sources.
The largest category of federal spending is for social welfare¾Social Security,
Medicare, Medicaid, as well as AFDC and other direct transfer programs, that comprise
                                         
43 We used federal data on contracts and expenditures that are listed by county.  These data only exist for
the time period that we cover in Tables 4 and 5.
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about two-thirds of the listed expenditures.  (Table 5)  The second largest spending class
is federal spending for wages and salaries paid to federal employees and direct purchases
of equipment, supplies, and services.  This spending is the source of a bit more than $1
billion in expenditures per year and accounts for about 30 percent of total direct federal
expenditures.  This spending makes the federal government one of Cleveland’s largest
customers for goods and services.  Community development is the third largest category
at nearly a half billion dollars per year.  This category includes Community Development
Block Grant (CDBG) payments, infrastructure grants (sewers, roads, and the like), and
direct housing assistance from all sources (from public housing funds to Federal Housing
Authority and Veterans Authority loans).  The largest area of direct community
development expenditure is housing, although as we noted, a great deal of federally
supported infrastructure spending flows through the state budget and is undercounted in
our figures.  In 1993 CDBGs accounted for a bit more than $25 million in direct federal
property and wage tax relief to local tax payers.
The two smallest categories of expenditure are research and economic
development.  Research expenditures account for nearly 2 percent of direct federal
expenditures in the region and are a strategic focus of the region’s development efforts.
These funds have increased by nearly a third over the decade from 1983 to 1993.  Medical
research increased in real, inflation adjusted, terms from between $40 million to $45
million in the mid-1980s to $60 million to $65 million in the early 1990s.  These research
funds are partially the result of increased emphasis on medical research by the community
foundations and Cleveland Tomorrow in terms of grants made to the two
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major research hospitals in the region and lobbying for state and federal investments in
biomedical research through the Edison Program (Case Western Reserve University’s
Medical School and the Cleveland Clinic are partners in the Edison Biotechnology
Program).  Table 6 contains a listing of the sources and uses of funds in projects that
Cleveland Tomorrow was involved in from its beginning in 1982 until 1991.44  The upper
panel of that table lists the source of funds by use and it shows that the Edison
Biotechnology Center is primarily a funding partnership between the federal government,
it was responsible for 52 percent of the funding, and State government, which provided 46
percent of the funding.
Science and engineering research operates at between $20 to $25 million per year
and much of this is activity that revolves around the NASA Lewis Research Center.
However, direct research spending is not the full extent of the scientific and research base
of the region’s development efforts.  Of greater importance is the application of off-the-
shelf technologies to existing firms.  These efforts revolve around CAMP and the Ohio
Aerospace Institute (OAI).  Both are public-private partnerships.  CAMP received 10
percent of its funding up to 1992 from federal sources, half of its funding from the State of
Ohio, and 40 percent from contracts and memberships.  OAI receives 22 percent of its
funds from the federal government and 75 percent from the state, this partially reflects the
fact that OAI is a younger organization than CAMP.
                                         
44 Joseph Roman, the Executive Director of Cleveland Tomorrow, made these data available.  He noted
that if they were updated they would reflect higher expenditures from the County Government, due to
Gateway’s expenses and the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame.  At the same time foundation and corporate
contributions to the Great Lakes Science Center have increased their share of expenses in the Northcoast
development area.  The Rock Hall and the Science Center are not represented in the  data.
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The smallest area of federal expenditure is direct economic development funding.
One of the program categories, UDAG, no longer exists.  In its peak year, 1986, it
accounted for $40.4 million in expenditure.  From 1981 to 1988 UDAGs accounted for
$103.3 million in expenditures.45  Eighty percent of the UDAG funds were for office and
commercial structures, mostly in Cleveland’s downtown, ten percent were for housing
projects, 4.2 percent for industrial projects, and 5 percent were for health and other
institutional projects.  The bulk of the funds went to 16 downtown commercial grants
(Tower City received 5 grants for $31.5 million, or a bit less than a third of the total).
Seventy percent of the grants went to downtown projects, 16 percent of the funds
supported neighborhood projects, and nearly 8 percent was spent in the University Circle
area.  A large part of the renewal of Cleveland’s downtown was financed by UDAGs.
What was the federal role in Cleveland’s revitalization?  The federal government
was more than a banker; it was a catalyst.  Local observers have been too myopic about
the federal role and have concentrated too long and too hard on the politics of the 1970s
in explaining the lack of investment during the Kucinich years (some going so far as to
describe the lack of investment as a “capital strike”).  The fact of the matter was that
Cleveland was a terrible place to invest in during the late 1970s.  Local politics was
gridlocked, but that was only a fraction of the story.  Before the Celeste Administration,
the State of Ohio was unwilling to reinvest in the state’s urban core and suburban
investment was (and continues) to place Ohio’s cities at a competitive disadvantage.
However, the state’s starvation of its cities is also a minor player.  During the 1970s
Cleveland was the center of a region of shrinking population and the core of its
                                         
45Keating, Krumholz and Metzger (1995), page 341.
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Table 6
The Distribution of Funds by Sources and Uses Among Programs Affiliated with
Cleveland Tomorrow from 1982 to 1991
SOURCES OF FUNDS (% Distribution by Program)
USES OF FUNDS Government
(Programs) Corporate Foundation Federal State Local Other TOTAL
BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT 18% 14% 53% 15% 99%
     Technology Transfer 2% 12% 53% 32% 100%
Clev. Advan Mfg. Prog (CAMP) 10% 49% 41% 100%
Ohio Aerospace Institute 3% 22% 75% 100%
Work in NE Ohio (WINOC) 36% 64% 100%
     Entrepreneurship 36% 1% 56% 7% 100%
Enterprise Development  (EDI) 36% 18% 14% 32% 100%
Primus Capital Corp. 36% 58% 6% 100%
     Technology Development 52% 46% 1% 1% 100%
Edison Biotechnology Center 76% 21% 2% 1% 100%
Special Technology Initiatives 100% 100%
CBD VISITOR/ENTERTAIN INDUSTRY 2% 1% 1% 6% 52% 39% 100%
Gateway 56% 44% 100%
Northcoast Development Corp. 13% 10% 13% 55% 6% 3% 100%
Playhouse Square Foundation 13% 7% 0% 23% 47% 10% 100%
CLEVELAND'S NEIGHBORHOODS 70% 9% 2% 19% 100%
Civic Vision 17% 28% 50% 5% 100%
Clev. Development Partnership 95% 3% 2% 100%
Cleveland Housing Network 46% 53% 100%
Neighborhood Progress (NPI) 10% 45% 4% 41% 100%
OTHER 41% 9% 10% 40% 100%
Health Quality Choice 17% 10% 73% 100%
Cleveland Tomorrow (CT) 62% 9% 20% 10% 100%
TOTAL 16% 2% 5% 21% 28% 28% 100%
SOURCES OF FUNDS (% Distribution by Source)
USES OF FUNDS (% Distribution) Government
(Programs) Corporate Foundation Federal State Local Other TOTAL
BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT 37% 6% 90% 86% 17% 33.1%
     Technology Transfer 2% 1% 28% 30% 13% 11.7%
Clev. Advan Mfg. Prog (CAMP) 1% 17% 20% 12% 8.5%
Ohio Aerospace Institute 11% 10% 2.7%
Work in NE Ohio (WINOC) 1% 1% 0.5%
     Entrepreneurship 35% 5% 42% 4% 15.4%
Enterprise Development  (EDI) 1% 5% 0.5%
Primus Capital Corp. 34% 42% 3% 14.9%
     Technology Development 62% 14% 6.0%
Edison Biotechnology Center 62% 4% 4.1%
Special Technology Initiatives 0% 9% 1.9%
CBD VISITOR/ENTERTAIN INDUSTRY 6% 32% 10% 14% 98% 72% 53.2%
Gateway 91% 70% 45.7%
Northcoast Development Corp. 3% 19% 10% 10% 1% 3.9%
Playhouse Square Foundation 3% 13% 4% 6% 1% 3.7%
CLEVELAND'S NEIGHBORHOODS 52% 53% 1% 8% 11.9%
Civic Vision 6% 1% 0.4%
Clev. Development Partnership 43% 12% 7.2%
Cleveland Housing Network 8% 5% 2.7%
Neighborhood Progress (NPI) 1% 35% 2% 1.6%
OTHER 5% 8% 1% 3% 1.8%
Health Quality Choice 1% 4% 2% 0.9%
Cleveland Tomorrow (CT) 4% 4% 1% 1.0%
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Economy was in decline.  Real estate investors would have been crazy to invest until the
economic fundamentals improved; and that is what the strategic vision for the region
addressed.  The federal government’s investments came as the fundamentals were
improving and the success of the downtown projects did much to improve the investment
climate of the entire region.  However, the federal investments were only made due to a
combination of fortuitous politics and regional preparation.
In the current round of story-telling about Cleveland’s revitalization there is a
danger that the federal role will be reduced to that of a part-time banker, but it played a far
larger role.  Janis Purdy noted three influences the federal government had on the nascent
Voinovich Economic Development Department.  First, the federal programs served as role
models and targets for the efforts of the Department.  The programs diffused information
about how to set up, run, and prioritize a local economic development program.  The
planning grants and planning requirements of the Economic Development Administration,
in particular, forced the city to think strategically about where to invest both effort and
money.  Federal program requirements also served to train local bureaucrats on good
development practices.  Finally, evaluation does not exist unless it is mandated and
directed by the federal government.  Purdy asked rhetorically: “Where did we learn to
articulate these goals?  We learned in EDA documents and in CUED (Council for Urban
Economic Development) meetings.”
In Cleveland’s experience the federal government had a number of roles.  It is at its
best when it plays a catalytic role, as it did in Cleveland with UDAGs and downtown
development, and as it is playing with the Empowerment Zone.  What federal involvement
allows a well organized city to do is to do projects and development to scale.  Without
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federal involvement scale cannot be achieved.  This is the promise it offers in tackling the
brownfields problem.  However, there is a flip side to federal involvement: when the
federal government engages in investments that are destructive to cities, it can do that to
scale as well.
There is a difference is dealing with the federal and state governments when you
are from a place like Cleveland, and this is best expressed by Shatten: “In my fifteen years
at Cleveland Tomorrow I worked with the State and developed policy with the State.  My
dealings with DC were just transactional.”
The federal government has had three separate roles in Cleveland’s revitalization.
At its best it is catalytic.  This was the case in UDAGs, infrastructure, and research and
development investments.  At other times the federal government was controlling; this is
the case when the court system becomes involved in an issue.  In many cases the federal
government’s role is marginal, it plays the role of banker.  The federal government cannot
stimulate change at the local level, it can just facilitate change by providing the resources,
in combination with funds from state and local government, to bring a local effort to
meaningful scale.
The federal influence waned in Cleveland as the 1980s wore on and the UDAG
program began to sunset.  David Sweet thought that the federal role “may begin and end
with the UDAG program.”  Purdy saw a large difference between the federal role in 1979,
at the beginning of the Voinovich Administration and in 1986.  In 1979 the federal
programs, especially UDAG, was the prize around which the Economic Development
Department was organized.  But, said Purdy, “when the dollars declined and uncertainty
grew about the federal role in cities and development, the feds lost their role as the driving
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force.  But the federal programs left a legacy of trained professionals and of development
models.”  The original set of downtown development projects depended on federal
funding, but as those funds waned, and as the risks from investing in Cleveland diminished,
the focus of development shifted to large civic projects that used a mix of funding sources.
A Story of Leverage
The federal government played an  indispensable and substantial role in
Cleveland’s development efforts.  It was critical to use the federal money
opportunistically.  Cleveland is not big enough, or important enough, to
influence national policy.  The trick is to be well enough organized to grab
from whatever source in support of its own goals.  You must be opportunistic.
¾Richard Shatten
Development in Greater Cleveland has relied on a mix of funds.  If you took all of
the projects that Cleveland Tomorrow was engaged in from 1982 to 1991 and looked at
the distribution of sources the diversity becomes clear¾howev r it is largely a diversity
among public sources.  The corporate and foundation community in Cleveland provided
18 percent of the funding to the projects in which Cleveland Tomorrow became involved
and the federal government only provided 5 percent of the funding (the Cleveland
Tomorrow figures do not include the projects that were funded with UDAGS and they do
not include tax expenditures that many of these projects generated).  State government
provided 21 percent of the funds and local government¾primarily the County¾provided
28 percent (and the County’s share has grown substantially since 1992).  Another 28
percent of the funding came from other sources, such as membership dues and contracts.
It is useful to examine the two panels of Table 6 and see how each of the strategic goals of
the region were financed.
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The dominant goal of the 1980s was to create an economically competitive
rationale for Cleveland’s downtown.  The original strategy focused on a mix of
headquarters employment, retailing and entertainment and latter migrated to embrace the
creation of a visitor destination industry.  The dominant source of funding was state and
local government for the large civic projects that followed the UDAG supported
commercial development in downtown.  A second goal was to invest in the city’s
neighborhoods.  Here the corporate sector is credited with the largest investments, thanks
in large part to the CRA agreements the White Administration struck with area banks.
This is also an area in which the local community foundations invested about half of their
funds, mostly due to the establishments of Neighborhood Progress Incorporated.
The federal hand is most prominent in Cleveland Tomorrow’s business
development activities.  The federal involvement in the Edison Biotechnology Center,
CAMP, and OAI dominated the funding stream and it is these programs that will, in the
long run, have the greatest impact on the region’s economic future.
What then are the lessons for the federal government from Cleveland’s efforts at
revitalization?  There are many.  First, the federal government has a critical role to play in
monitoring and evaluating and disseminating knowledge about economic development
strategies.  They can only do this if they are an investor in development projects and, in
effect, purchase a seat at the table.  Second, the promise of federal funds can be catalytic,
but the competition for those funds must force the local community to place projects in a
strategic context, and the strategy must be shown to be reasonable.  Third, private-public
development partnerships work, but they must represent a broad coalition of support for
the specific project.  Fourth, local government must be especially effective in its ability to
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carry out a project or there must be a broad and deep civic infrastructure that can see
projects through to completion.  Finally, there needs to be a high degree of local match to
the federal investment.  It is unlikely that the match will be dominated by investments from
the private sector.  The match will come from other units of government, local
foundations, and in the case of economic development intermediaries from memberships
once the program has proven its worth.  There was an inadvertent rationale to the pattern
of federal involvement in Cleveland.  It started rather large and then tailed off.  This
pattern was not by design, it was a result of the government’s gradual withdrawal from
urban development.  There was always local match but that match increased as time wore
on.  This implies that once a place has demonstrated that it has the civic infrastructure to
do development, and it has an economically viable rationale based on the demonstrated
competencies of its economy, federal investments make a substantial difference in the
future of a city.
Cleveland also shows what this model, which is essentially a model for bricks and
mortar physical development model, cannot accomplish.  The Cleveland-style
development model cannot deal with long term issues of racial isolation, poverty, public
housing, and other related social services.  Local critics constantly present false choices
when discussing public subsidy of the large civic projects such as Gateway and the
Northcoast Harbor developments.  They will contrast public expenditures, and votes for
special purpose taxes, to support these projects as taking money away from vital public
services in the city (such as the public school system).  In reality, the largely suburban
public who are paying the taxes to support these projects will not voluntarily transfer
money to another jurisdiction to support social services.  Where there is ample room for
and the Accompanying Case Study
Ned Hill Page 83 February 1997
criticism is the amount of time, effort, and political capital that is required to sell the civic
projects to the public.  This then is another lesson for federal policy from Cleveland.  The
federal government can provide incentives so that state, county, and local government can
focus on issues of long term economic and social distress.  Without these incentives local
politics will direct funding away from these problems.
Social problems are political problems that cannot be solved through bricks and
mortar.  They are also national economic problems.  A public-private partnership model
can bring pressure to bear to correct a dysfunctional bureaucracy.  A public-private
partnership can recognize how a dysfunctional and inefficient social service system is
raising local costs and needs solution.  But public-private partnerships work best when
they address a short term tangible problem that have identifiable solutions.  These
problems are not really local, no matter how much the federal government would like to
wish them away to another unit of government.
Cleveland’s civic leadership has touted itself as the “comeback” city for over a
decade.  In so doing it has racked-up five All-American City awards, and a large share of
national press and political attention over a rebuilt downtown.  Employment in the region
has rebounded, marked by unemployment rates below the nation’s for the past several
years, and by large investments in plant and equipment in the outlying portions of the
metropolitan area, particularly by the automobile industry and its suppliers.  Yet, there is
wide-spread realization that while the downtown has changed its economic function since
1979, so has the city’s neighborhoods—and not for the better.  The city’s neighborhoods,
with few exceptions, are poorer than ever, despite considerable efforts expended to attract
new middle-income residents to the city.  The growth in poverty has also begun to spread
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to the city’s inner-ring suburbs, which has been noted locally and in the President’s 1995
urban policy report.  Greater Cleveland’s recent history is a local manifestation of national
economic problems¾its current spatial form is the culmination of anti-city bias in national
public policies, combined with a bias in favor of low density metropolitan
development¾mediated by locally generated efforts to change the region’s traditional
economic base.
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